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Abstract
The distribution patterns of toxic sources in Louisiana reveal 
that some communities may be disproportionately exposed to potential 
environmental risks. This dissertation examines whether the location 
and environmental control behavior of toxic polluters are 
systematically related to the socioeconomic and racial characteristics 
of communities. The study identifies who lives in the immediate 
proximity of toxic sources and determines whether the characteristics 
of these communities are different from those of Louisiana’s general 
population. The results reveal that income levels in communities that 
host toxic sources are consistently and significantly lower than the 
state averages. A distance gradient analysis indicates that as distance 
from the nearest toxic source increases, the mean percentage of blacks 
in the community decreases and the mean percentage of whites increases. 
The results provide support to the hypothesis that low income and 
minority groups are disproportionately exposed to environmental risks. 
The study also tests whether changes in potential exposure to risks 
differ significantly across socioeconomic groups. The estimation 
results indicate that the higher the income levels, the more educated, 
and the more politically active the community, the greater the 
reductions in toxic discharges over time. Furthermore, the greater the 
percentage of blacks in a community, the greater the reductions in 
discharges. In terms of relative importance, income is a more important 
factor than race in explaining aggregate reductions in discharges.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Concern over environmental quality distribution across regions and 
socioeconomic groups is growing in the United States. Research 
indicates that environmental amenities are not evenly distributed 
across the population. Freeman (1972) correlated socioeconomic data 
with air quality readings in three cities; his findings indicated that 
low-income and non-white groups were exposed to poorer air quality 
conditions. Asch and Seneca (1978) reported that exposure to air 
pollutants was higher in cities with low-income characteristics. In an 
examination of hazardous waste sites, a study conducted by the United 
Church of Christ (1987) reported "a striking relationship between the 
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities and race" (p. xiii). 
Environmental quality differences between otherwise homogeneous 
communities is attributed to the intensity of industrial activity. 
Evidently, the more densely populated an area is with industry the 
lower its environmental quality. An issue of particular concern, and 
some debate, is the relative environmental risk borne by low income and 
racial minority communities. There is growing evidence suggesting that 
people who live in polluted areas are poor, and most likely, ethnic
1
minorities who cannot afford to live in better neighborhoods. Chapter 2 
examines the empirical literature on environmental quality distribution 
in order to review and evaluate the evidence that racial minorities and 
low income groups bear a disproportionate risk burden.
This dissertation attempts to determine whether exposure to 
environmental hazards is systematically related to socioeconomic 
characteristics of the population. It seeks to establish whether there 
is a statistical relation between toxic releases or changes in those 
releases over time and income, race, population, population density, 
age, sex, and education of nearby residents. The study does not propose 
to establish whether these relations, if they exist, are fair or 
equitable, or efficient in any sense. It does not seek to determine any 
causal factors which may lie behind location decisions of facilities or 
households. Nor does it seek to determine the historic sequence of 
location decisions. It investigates more elementary issues of whether 
risks and risk reductions are consistently related to surrounding
community characterestics, given the existing locations of sources and
households.
This dissertation attempts to explore the validity of the
hypothesis that low income and racial minority communities are 
"disproportionately" exposed to poorer environmental conditions. 
Towards this end, several questions should be asked. Who lives in 
polluted areas? Do the characteristics of these people differ from 
others? If so, how? This discussion makes up the central thesis for 
Chapter 3. This chapter examines the geographic and social distribution 
of toxic sources statewide across Louisiana communities. Louisiana is 
appropriately chosen as the study area because of the high
concentration of chemical and petroleum industry, major sources of 
toxic emissions into the environment.
Chapter 3 is partially a replication of other studies in the 
literature. Following the "site distribution" models in the literature, 
this chapter uses parish and zip code level data to study the 
geographic distribution of toxic chemical releasing facilities. After 
identifying the socioeconomic and racial status of the communities 
surrounding these toxic sources, the study proceeds exploring whether, 
and how, the characteristics of these communities are different from 
those of Louisiana’s general population. This is accomplished by 
comparing the means of the parish and zip. code samples to that of 
Louisiana’s benchmark values.
Following the "community exposure" models in the literature, the 
number of toxic releasing firms and the total and per-capita toxic 
discharges are used alternatively as proxies for potential exposure to 
risk. Correlation analysis is performed between these exposure measures 
and several socioeconomic variables characterizing the communities 
surrounding the polluting firms. It should be stressed that this 
approach, used intensely in the literature, is not intended to explain 
cause and effect relationships. It merely shows the degree of spatial 
association between the two sets of variables. Chapter 3 tests how 
sensitive the relations are to the level of community aggregation.
A major contribution of Chapter 3 is the explicit recognition of 
the role that distance from a pollution source plays in determining the 
burden of potential environmental risks. Exposure to toxics is assumed 
to be inversely related to distance from the source. This chapter 
empirically tests whether socioeconomic and racial characteristics of
communities change as distance from the pollution sources increases. It 
uses block group level data which are geographically much smaller than 
both parishes and zip code areas. They provide high resolution 
information about communities surrounding the toxic sources. Locational 
proximity is established by calculating distances of block groups from 
their nearest polluting facilities using one mile intervals.
This study suggests that persistent forces, such as normal 
optimizing behavior of individuals and businesses, may lead to 
"disproportionate" exposures. Residential and industrial location 
choices of households and firms may help explain why some neighborhoods 
bear relatively higher risk burdens then others. However, the 
environmental control behavior of firms and the response behavior of 
communities may also be important factors in determining which 
communities are, or will be, exposed to higher environmental risks. 
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model that captures the relationship 
between the hazard production behavior of a firm and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the communities surrounding the firm. In this 
chapter the utility maximizing household is assumed to have several 
options for remedial actions: adaptation, advocacy, and litigation. A 
price tag is attached to every option. Firms have a profit motive to 
reduce pollution when community response is expected to increase 
regulatory and compliance cost.
The theoretical model in Chapter 4 suggests that the usual 
optimizing behavior of firms and households may explain, to a certain 
extent, the distribution of environmental hazard across communities. 
The ability and willingness of households to pursue remediation efforts 
to alleviate or compensate for the environmental disamenity have direct
effects on the environmental control behavior of firms. Chapter 5 
proceeds with an empirical study of the firms’ discharge control 
behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to test whether the 
environmental control behavior of toxic chemical releasing firms are 
related to socioeconomic and racial characterestics of surrounding 
communities. For example, would firms’ decisions to reduce 
environmental risks be related to racial or economic makeup of 
surrounding communities? A single equation model of discharge reduction 
is posited as a function of several variables describing the people and 
the general area where firms are located. This equation is estimated 
for different types of discharges, at alternative community aggregation 
levels.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the 





The distribution of pollutants across regions and socioeconomic
groups and their effects on economic activity have been the subject of
many studies. Research indicates that pollutants impose a wide range of
adverse effects on economic activity, directly or indirectly, through
variety of channels. Human health represents one of the more obvious
effects. Numerous studies confirm the existence of a close association
between health, as measured by mortality and morbidity rates, and air 
1pollution. Health problems associated with exposure to hazardous and 
toxic chemicals often necessitate expenditures on health care or 
absence from school or work and in extreme cases cause permanent 
disability or death. Pollutants can also have damaging effects on 
materials and vegetation through influencing deterioration rates of 
materials and agricultural productivity of land.2 Finally, pollutants
1 See Lave (1972), Lave and Seskin (1970), Liu and Yu (1976), Ostro 
(1983), and Krupnick, Harrington and Ostro (1990).
2 For a comprehensive review of the literature see Liu and Yu (1976).
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impose aesthetic damages ranging from reduced atmospheric visibility to
3reduced property values. Improvements in environmental quality would 
mean reducing the magnitude of these adverse effects. The quantitative 
significance of these effects has been investigated and often used to 
evaluate the economic efficiency of proposed environmental programs 
aimed at improving the quality of life.
While the concern with efficiency aspect of the proposed programs 
is an important issue, the distributive impact of these programs is 
equally important. Most empirical studies suggest that environmental 
quality is not distributed evenly across the population. A wide range 
of variation in air quality readings are observed across cities. Baumol 
and Oates (1979) reported that "the average concentrations of sulfur 
dioxide vary all the way from 47 milligrams per cubic meter in 
Washington, D.C., to 236 milligram per cubic meter in New York City, a 
ratio of more than five to one." (p. 226). Liu and Yu (1976) showed
that health damage estimates from air pollutants vary across regions; 
annual mortality damages due to sulfur dioxide vary from less than $0.1 
million in Charleston, West Virginia, to $329 million in New York C'ity. 
Furthermore, a study conducted by Citizen Action showed that, in 1988, 
ten states alone accounted for over fifty percent of all toxic releases 
into the environment.
The distributional aspects of environmental policies have always 
been a source of concern to policy makers and social scientists. An 
issue of particular concern, and some debate, is the relative
3 For property value studies, see: Anderson and Crocker (1971), Freeman 
(1974), Nelson (1979), Frankel (1985, 1991), Kohlhase (1991), and
Greenburg and Hughes (1992).
environmental risk burden borne by low income and racial minority 
communities. It is reasonable to expect that communities surrounded by 
multiple sources of air pollution, toxic and hazardous waste 
facilities, and commercial landfills face higher than average 
"potential" environmental risks. However, an important research 
question is whether, and why, particular race and income groups face 
greater exposure to such risks than others. In fact, there is growing 
evidence suggesting that low income and minority groups are 
disproportionately exposed to poorer environmental quality conditions, 
mostly due to locational proximity to hazard sources.
Until the early eighties the major source of concern has been the 
impact of environmental policies on different income groups. However, 
the 1982 demonstrations against siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl 
(PCB) landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, with predominantly 
black and poor population, added a new dimension to the distributive 
issues, namely the impact of policies on minority groups. In response 
to these demonstrations, District of Colombia Delegate Walter Fauntroy 
requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) investigate the 
siting process of hazardous waste landfills and their correlation with 
the racial and economic status of the surrounding communities. The GAO 
study focused on four offsite hazardous waste landfills in eight 
southeastern States. No explanations were provided as to why these 
specific sites were selected. Based on 1980 Census data, the study 
concluded that at three of the four hazardous waste landfill sites the 
majority of the population was black. Although limited in scope, this 
study provided evidence in support of racial minorities bearing a 
disproportionate risk burden. However, its significance was not only in
the results it presented but the fact that it provoked further research 
interest in the environmental quality issues as they relate to the 
distribution of risk across race and income.
This chapter examines the empirical literature on the distribution 
of environmental risk across socioeconomic groups in order to review 
and evaluate the evidence that racial minorities and low income groups 
bear a disproportionate risk burden. Section II presents a servey of 
studies attempting to find a relationship between various measures of 
pollution and socioeconomic characteristics of communities and studies 
that attempt to measure the incidence of pollution on various income 
and race groups. Section III presents the anticipated contribution of 
the current study to the empirical literature.
II. Survey of the Literature
A large body of literature supports the hypothesis that economic 
activity is adversely affected by the presence of pollutants. While 
studying the impact of pollutants on human health, materials, and 
vegetation is an important task, the ultimate objective is to design 
policies aimed at reducing the magnitude of damages. Tracing the path 
to exposure and identifying the regions and the communities most 
affected by the presence of pollutants are necessary for designing and 
implementing sound environmental control policies.
"Community exposure" models attempt to determine whether exposure 
to air pollutants is related to the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the population. In these models, the level of ambient pollution 
measured at an outdoor monitor station serves as a surrogate for 
individual exposure in the vicinity of a residence, school, or place of 
work. In assessing the distribution of air pollutants by income or
race, the typical approach has been to correlate the average or the 
median family income and the minority percentage of the community with 
the measure of exposure. "Site distribution" models focus on the 
location of hazardous and toxic waste sites and their correlation with 
the social and economic make-up of the communities surrounding them. 
The following sections review studies pertaining to the distribution of 
air pollutants across communities, and those pertaining to the
distribution of hazardous sites across communities,
a. Air Pollution Studies
Freeman (1972) undertook the first attempt to determine whether 
the existing patterns of air pollution impose an absolutely greater 
burden on low income households. Using air quality readings for
sulfates and particulates in Kansas City, St. Louis, and Washington, 
D.C., together with socioeconomic data at the Census Tract level, he 
constructed indexes of pollution exposure per family classified by 
income, race, and housing tenure. His findings suggested a systematic 
inverse relationship between pollution exposure and average family 
income in each of the three cities examined. In Kansas City, the
average family earning less than $3,000 per year (the lowest income 
class) was exposed to 76.7pgm/ml of suspended particulates while the 
average family earning more than $25,000 (the highest income class) was 
exposed to 58.1pgm/ml of suspended particulates. In St. Louis, these 
respective exposure levels were 91.3pgm/ml and 64.9/jgm/ml; and in 
Washington, D.C., they were 64.6pgm/ml and 42pgm/ml. While the existing 
patterns of both air pollutants indicated that air quality was
distributed in a manner favorable to the rich within the city, there 
was a significant variation between the cities in the overall pollution
levels. The lowest income class in Washington, D.C. was exposed to 
lower levels of suspended particulates than the highest income class in 
St. Louis. Freeman also found dramatic differences in exposure, both 
within and across cities, between blacks and whites; "[in] each city 
the average black family has a higher exposure to both air pollutants 
than does the average family (black or white) with an income under 
$3,000" (p.264). The study also indicated that home owners were exposed 
to lower levels of pollutants than renters.
Zupan (1973) examined the quality of air in the New York region in 
an attempt to determine whether differences in exposure are observed 
across alternative income groups. To determine the relative exposure of 
income groups to varying levels of air quality, Zupan employed two 
sources of air quality data: direct indicators of air quality from
monitoring stations and indirect indicators based on the amount and 
location of major emission sources. By geographically matching air 
quality data with income data derived from IRS income tax returns, he 
performed correlation analysis to test the association of four 
alternative indicators of air quality (sulfur dioxide, smokeshade, 
settleable particulates, and suspended particulates) with four income 
measures: mean per capita income, the percentages of tax returns
reporting less than $3,000 income (low income households), between 
$3,000 and $10,000 income (middle income households), and more than 
$10,000 income (high income households). The results showed a 
significantly positive association between each of the four air quality 
indicators and the percentage of low income households in the 
population. However, the results did not indicate that the converse was 
necessarily true: "a high proportion of high income people does not
necessarily imply high air quality." (p. 3). Although the correlation 
coefficients between all four indicators and the percentage of high 
income households had the expected negative sign, only two indicators 
showed a highly significant relationship. As far as the middle income 
households were concerned, the results indicated that "the middle class 
is about as bad off as the poor." (p. 17).
To determine how many persons in each income group were exposed to 
a particular concentration of residuals, Zupan estimated cumulative 
exposure profiles by income group. The results, for all four indicators 
of air quality, revealed a consistent pattern: "the low income
population is exposed to higher concentrations then the higher income 
population." (p. 18). Furthermore, differences in exposure between
income groups also revealed a consistent pattern: "the differences
between low and middle income groups are always less than the 
differences between middle and high income groups." (p. 18).
Asch and Seneca (1978) provided further evidence indicating that 
poorer income groups are exposed to higher pollution levels than their 
rich counterparts, both within and across cities in the United States. 
They investigated the intra-state inter-city variations in air quality 
by correlating the annual geometric mean of particulates with various 
socioeconomic variables for a sample of 284 cities in 23 states. Their 
results suggested that "[e]xposure to particulate matter is relatively 
higher in cities with low-income characteristics, whether measured by 
income level, income distribution, or the poverty tail of the 
distribution." (p. 282). Furthermore, their study suggested that "such 
cities are also characterized by low education levels, low property
values, and large and densely concentrated populations which are (to a 
lesser extent) relatively non-white and aged." (p. 283).
Similar results were obtained in the intra-city study of air 
quality distribution. Correlation coefficients were calculated between 
three alternative categories of air pollutants (sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, and particulates) and Census Tract level 
socioeconomic variables in three cities: Chicago, Nashville, and
Cleveland. Patterns observed in the state-based data also emerged in 
the intra-city samples for each pollutant. Income variables 
consistently confirmed that poorer Census Tracts experience higher 
pollution levels. However, the association between racial composition 
and pollution exposure was highly variable across both cities and 
pollutants. In Chicago, for instance, the correlation coefficients 
between the percentage of the population that is non-white and the 
annual means of particulates and sulfur dioxide were positive. In 
Cleveland, the correlation coefficient was "weakly" positive for sulfur 
dioxide, negative for particulates, and "strongly" negative for nitogen 
dioxide. Nashville, on the other hand, showed significantly positive 
coefficients for both particulates and nitrogen dioxide and a negative 
coefficient for sulfur dioxide.
Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) analyzed the distribution of 
benefits, both physical and monetary, from improvements in air quality 
(in the Boston Metropolitan area), resulting from the implementation of 
the federal automotive emission controls mandated by the 1970 Clean Air 
Act amendments. Using Census data on household locations and incomes, 
together with Boston area air pollution monitoring data, they estimated 
the average residential exposure to nitrogen oxide (NOX), a major
automobile pollutant, by income group and housing tenure. The results 
revealed that lower income households were exposed to poorer air
quality than higher income households. Without regulation, annual NOX 
concentrations ranged from 5.92 pphm for households earning less than 
S3,000 to 4.99 pphm for those earning more than $25,000. With 
automobile emission controls in effect, the estimated residential 
exposure to NOX was lower at all income levels, ranging from 5.24 pphm
for households earning less than $3,000 to 4.53 pphm for households
earning more than $25,000 per year. The differences in average
residential exposure estimates between pre-control and post-control 
represented the physical benefit of improved air quality. The results 
revealed that the physical benefits of emission controls, at place of 
residence, were distributed in a manner favorable to the poor. However, 
when workplace physical benefits by income group were combined with 
residence benefits, the results were much less beneficial to the poor. 
The distribution of dollar benefits from improvements in air quality 
was shown to be slightly favorable to the poor when renters retained 
all benefits. The estimated benefits for households earning less than 
$3,000 per year was $91 per year, compared to $81 per year for 
households earning more than $25,000 per year. However, when tenant 
benefits were capitalized into higher rents and the benefits were 
passed on to the rental property owners then the distribution of 
benefits was no longer in favor of the poor. Average benefits ranged 
from $46 for the lowest income households to $126 for the highest 
income group. Only when expressed as a percentage of income, monetary 
benefits were consistently higher for the poor. Nevertheless, when
workplace benefits were included in the analysis, the monetray benefits 
from emission controls were relatively lower for the poor.
Gianessi, Peskin and Wolff (1977) assessed the distribution of air 
pollution damages on a nationwide basis. Their findings did not support 
the hypothesis that air quality is distributed in a manner favorable to 
the rich. Mean per capita damage estimates ranged from $72 for families 
making $1,000 or less to $142.76 for families making above $15,000. In 
terms of per capita damages, high income groups suffered the greatest 
damages. The study revealed that non-whites clearly suffer more damage 
than whites. The mean per capita pollution damage incurred by 
non-whites was $115.67, while the damage incurred by whites was $97.55.
Wernette and Nieves (1991), in a study of areas designated by EPA 
as out of compliance with the Clean Air Act, provided further evidence 
on disproportionate risk borne by racial minorities. A higher 
percentage of blacks and hispanics, compared to whites, live in air 
non-attainment areas for particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur 
dioxide, and lead. In 1988, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry reported that the percentage of black children with high blood 
lead levels was significantly higher than white children at all income 
levels. For both races, increasing income was associated with lower 
blood lead concentration.
A more recent study, Brajer and Hall (1992), associated levels of 
exposure to ozone and fine particulate matter in the South Coast Air 
Basin of California with resident income, race, age, and education. A 
Regional Human Exposure (REHEX) model provided the basis for estimating 
exposure not only on location of residence, but also on mobility within 
the Basin and time spent in various activities indoors and outdoors.
The results confirmed that the highest income groups faced less 
exposure to ozone and fine particulate matter. It also provided 
evidence that ethnic minorities and children received the greatest 
exposure level in the Basin. In addition, the study suggested that if 
microenvironmental factors such as amount of time spent indoors, 
outdoors, or in transit are incorporated into the correlation analysis, 
then the estimated differences in individual exposures will be lower 
than the estimates based on "community exposure" models.
Using alternative air pollution exposure indices, Gelobter (1992) 
presented further evidence on the uneven distribution of outdoor air 
pollution across socioeconomic groups. His study not only examined the 
absolute levels of exposure to total suspended particulates from 1970 
to 1984, but also the changes in exposure due to relative improvements 
in air pollution since the enactment of the Clean Air Act of 1970. 
Gelobter’s findings indicated that average exposure to total suspended 
particulates, in urban areas, was regressively distributed, although 
differences in exposure by income group were relatively small. He found 
striking differences in average exposure by race. Over the fifteen year 
period, minorities were consistently exposed to higher levels of 
pollution than their white counterparts. However, an important finding 
of his study was that while the poor experienced a much lower relative 
decrease in exposure than the rich, non-whites experienced slightly 
greater relative reductions in exposure than whites.
Napton and Day (1992) studied the distribution of the major air 
polluting industries in the state of Texas in an effort to determine 
whether the characteristics of people and places most affected by 
pollutants, those living in Census tracts within approximately one mile
of polluting industries, differ significantly from those of randomly 
selected Census tracts in Texas, the control group. The socioeconomic 
variables capturing characteristics of people included: age, family
size, race, education, employment and income. The variables capturing 
characteristics of places included: home ownership, age of housing
units, value of housing, and stability of the neighborhood (measured by 
mean number of years housing units are occupied by owners, renters, or 
by either). Using discriminant analysis, where the dependent variable 
was whether a Census tract was in the polluted (the study area) or the 
control area, they determined which of the above variables best 
distinguished between the two groups. The statistical analysis 
indicated that the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities in 
the study group was significantly different from that of the control 
group. However, a major finding of the study was the rejection of the 
hypothesis that the population of the most polluted areas are poor, 
black or hispanic. In fact, contrary to most other studies, the people 
who lived in the polluted areas were white, somewhat educated (the 
average adults have completed about 12 years of school), middle-class 
people. Furthermore, compared to the population of the control area, 
the residents of the polluted areas were younger, families were larger, 
fewer families were headed by women, and a greater percentage of the 
population were home owners. The results indicated that mean rent was 
the most important discriminating independent variable; the mean rent 
in the polluted areas was higher than that of the control area. These 
results suggested that polluting industries were attracting employees 
who were willing to pay more for housing and tolerate pollutants in 
order to live near their jobs. Basically, "people may be living in
polluted neighborhoods simply because they are in close proximity to 
their jobs." (p. 523).
b. Site Distribution Studies
All studies reviewed thus far have focused on the distribution of 
air quality across regions and socioeconomic groups, mostly because air 
quality readings from outdoor monitor stations have been in the public 
domain for over three decades. The 1983 GAO study noted in the 
introduction to this chapter was the first study that did not use air 
quality data. It focused on the distribution of hazardous waste 
landfills and their correlation with the social and economic makeup of 
the surrounding communities. The findings of this study provided 
support that racial minorities bear a disproportionate risk burden. 
Several studies since the publication of the GAO study have examined 
the distribution of alternative sources of environmental hazards across 
the population.
Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States (1987), published by 
the United Church of Christ, represents the first comprehensive 
national study of the demographic patterns associated with the location 
of hazardous waste sites. This study, more carefully designed than the 
GAO study, examined the statistical relationship between commercial 
hazardous waste facility locations and the racial and socioeconomic 
composition of host communities nationwide. It also studied the 
demographic patterns associated with the uncontrolled toxic waste 
sites. The study revealed strong correlations between race and location 
of commercial hazardous waste facilities. The minority percentage was 
highest in communities with the greatest number of hazardous waste 
facilities. In communities with either one of the five largest
commercial hazardous waste landfills, or more than one treatment, 
storage and disposal facility, the average minority percentage was 
three times greater than in communities without such facilities. The 
report also concluded that the mean minority percentage of the
population was a more significant discriminator than the other 
variables (mean household income, mean value owner occupied home, 
pounds of hazardous waste generated per person) for differentiating 
communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities or large 
landfills. This is in direct contrast to the findings reported in
Napton and Day (1992) study cited above. Three out of the five largest
landfills, accounting for 40 percent of the total estimated commercial 
landfill capacity in the United States, were located in predominantly 
black and hispanic communities. Furthermore, the study revealed that 
"[tlhree out of every five Black and Hispanic Americans lived in
communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites." (p. xiv)
Bullard (1983, 1990) tested the historic relationship between the 
location of waste disposal facilities (incinerators and landfills) and 
the racial composition of neighborhoods in the Houston area. He 
reported that the city of Houston, up until the early seventies, owned 
and operated eight garbage incinerators and five municipal landfills. 
His findings indicated that while black neighborhoods constituted just 
one-fourth of Houston’s population, more than three-fourths of the 
city’s solid waste disposal facilities were located in these 
neighborhoods. Six out of eight incinerators were located in 
predominantly black neighborhoods, one was located in a hispanic 
community, and one in mostly white area. All five of the city-owned 
landfills were located in black neighborhoods.
White (1992) examined the relationship between the number of
hazardous waste sites in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and the racial 
composition of the communities surrounding these sites. Using Zip Code 
level data, he selected the ten largest black communities and the ten 
largest white communities in the city and studied the distribution of 
hazardous waste sites in each group. Fifteen of the twenty hazardous 
waste sites were located in predominantly black communities. He
reported that while minority communities have an average of one site 
for every 7,349 residents, white communities have only one site for 
every 31,100 residents. Furthermore, more than 99 percent of the total 
hazardous waste was disposed of in black communities.
Mohai and Bryant (1992) studied the distribution of commercial 
hazardous waste facilities in the Detroit area. They hoped to determine 
whether race has a relationship with the location of these facilities 
that is independent of income and to compare the relative strength of 
the relationship of race and income with the distribution of the sites. 
The study reported that a total of 21 commercial hazardous waste 
facilities were located in the state of Michigan; of which, 16 were
located in the Detroit area, which includes the city of Detroit and the
three counties surrounding it: Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne. And of these 
16, half were located in the city of Detroit. The minority percentages 
for the state, three-county area, and the city of Detroit were 16 
percent, 21 percent, and 76 percent, respectively. The study concluded 
that these facilities were clearly located disproportionately where 
minorities were most heavily concentrated. A detailed analysis of the 
distribution of the hazardous facilities in the study area indicated 
that while 18 percent of the population living more than 1.5 miles from
the facilities were minority residents, 39 percent of those living 
within 1.5 miles but more than 1 mile from the center of the facility 
were minority, and of those residents living within 1 mile from the 
facility, 48 percent were minority. A similar pattern was observed when 
the percentage of people living below the poverty level was examined. 
Using multiple regression analysis, they tested whether race had a 
relationship with the distance of residence to a hazardous waste 
facility independent of income. The test not only revealed that the
relationship between the two existed, but it also showed that race was
a better predictor than income.
Hird (1993) examined the geographic distribution of the Superfund 
sites across all counties in the United States in an effort to
determine whether the number of sites in each county was related to the
socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding areas. Specifically, 
he wanted to determine "whether Superfund-site risks disproportionately 
affect the poor or racial minorities" (p. 332). His findings, based on 
a multivariate Tobit analysis, indicated that the wealthier counties 
were likely to have more Superfund sites than the poorer counties. The 
county’s median housing value (used as a proxy for wealth) was 
positively correlated with the number of Superfund sites, while the 
percentage of population below poverty level was negatively correlated 
with the number of sites. Furthermore, the data indicated that counties 
with greater concentration of minorities were associated with more 
Superfund sites. Hence, Hird’s conclusion that "counties occupied by 
the wealthy, well-educated, or nonwhite stand to benefit 
disproportionately from cleanup of Superfund sites." (p. 333).
This conclusion was based on the analysis of more than 3,000
counties nationwide. In order to find any possible significant 
relationships within subsets of counties, Hird considered the 
relationships between the number of Superfund sites and counties 
characterized by high proportions of: individuals living below the
poverty level, unemployed people, racial minorities, and people living 
in lower-valued housing units. The results of his analysis indicated 
that while the number of Superfund sites in counties overrepresented by 
the poor and the unemployed was significantly below the national 
average, the number of sites in counties overrepresented by nonwhites 
was insignificantly below the national average. This is in direct
contrast to the findings reported in the 1987 United Church of Christ 
study cited above. In addition, significantly more sites were located 
in counties where the median house values were above the national 
average.
Hird also analyzed the pace of Superfund site cleanups in order to 
establish whether community socioeconomic characteristics had any 
influence in determining the speed of cleanup. His analysis indicated 
that there was "virtually no relationship between a site reaching a 
particular cleanup stage and the county’s socioeconomic 
characteristics." (p. 337).
III. Contribution of the Current Study
The main purpose of the current study is to examine the
distribution pattern of toxic sources in Louisiana and to determine 
whether there is a systematic relationship between the location and 
environmental control behavior of polluting firms and the socioeconomic 
and racial composition of the communities. Although the research
question is similar to that posed by many, this study is characterized 
by several unique features that will make it a valuable addition to the 
existing literature.
The first feature of the current study that sets it apart from the
existing literature is its choice of the environmental quality
indicator. While most studies in the literature concern themselves with 
the distribution of air quality and hazardous waste sites, this study 
focuses on the distribution of toxic sources. Numerous tragic accidents 
in the United States and around the world have indicated that toxic 
releases into the environment present a potential risk to human health 
and overall well being. However, a systematic study of the social
distribution of toxic hazards has not been yet undertaken, mainly 
because of lack of information on these sources. The current study 
fills this gap in the literature by employing a relatively new data 
base, the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory, that provides the most 
comprehensive record of toxic emissions into the environment, 
nationwide.4
The current study is concerned with the distribution of toxic 
sources statewide across Louisiana communities. Unlike other studies, 
the choice of the study area is not randomly determined. Louisiana
communities are particularly vulnerable to hazardous and toxic 
materials since the state hosts a large number of chemical and 
petroleum refining plants, major sources of toxic emissions into the
4 The information contained in this data base opens a whole new set of 
possibilities for researchers interested in studying the impact of 
pollutants on human health and economic activity. This data base 
expected to become a widely used indicator of environmental quality.
environment. According to a recent national study, Louisiana was ranked 
the largest per capita generator of toxics in 1988.5 Hence, compared to 
the people of other states, Louisiana communities are 
disproportionately exposed to higher levels of environmental hazards. 
Within the state, it is reasonable to expect that communities in the 
immediate vicinity of toxic sources face greater than average potential 
for toxic exposure. A question of particular interest to the current 
study is whether the socioeconomic status of these communites is 
significantly different from that of Louisiana’s general population 
characteristics. This question will basically investigate the claim 
that the poor and the racial minorities are particularly hard-hit by 
environmental pollution.
While most studies rely solely on a naive correlation analysis on 
observed bivariate relationships, this study is methodologically 
superior. A detailed spatial analysis will provide the basis for the 
investigation. Exposure to toxics is assumed to be, among other things, 
a function of locational proximity to pollution sources; the closer a 
community lives to a source, the higher its potential for toxic 
exposure. The usual approach to studying associations between pollution 
exposure and community socioeconomic characteristics is to use city or 
county level information on pollution and people; more recently, zip 
code level data have been employed. A major contribution of the current 
study is the development of a data base that identifies communities 
based on their distances from polluting firms. This data base is
5 Hall, Bob and Mary Lee Kerr, 1991-1992 Green Index: A State-by-State 
Guide to the Nation’s Environmental Health, (Island Press, Washington, 
D.C., 1991.
superior to the traditional data sources used in the literature because 
it allows for capturing variations in community characteristics that 
might exist within a community but disappear in city or county 
aggregates. This study performs a distance gradient analysis to 
determine whether the socioeconomic and racial characteristics of the 
communities change as the distance from pollution sources increases.
While most researchers agree that rational residential and 
industrial location choices of households and firms may explain why 
some communities bear relatively higher exposure burden than others, 
the current study argues that the environmental control behavior of 
firms and the response behavior of communities to environmental 
stressors may be critical in determining the distribution of hazards 
across communites. Within the context of profit maximization, a public 
choice theoretic model of firm behavior is introduced to capture 
relationships between hazard production and community characteristics. 
The model is then tested to determine whether pollution control 
behaviors of toxic releasing firms are systematically related to 
socioeconomic characteristics of surrounding communities.
In summary, this study hopes to identify who lives in Louisiana’s 
most polluted neighborhoods. It seeks to determine whether, and how, 
these communities differ from Louisiana’s general population, and 
whether or not there is a systematic relationship between the location 
and the pollution control behavior of the firms and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the population.
Chapter 3
Polluting Firms and Host Communities
I. Introduction
Toxic releases into the environment present a potential risk to
human health and overall well-being. Numerous tragic incidents
involving releases of hazardous and toxic materials into the
environment have triggered an increased awareness of the potential
effects of toxic exposure. Louisiana communities are particularly
vulnerable to hazardous and toxic materials since the state represents
home to disproportionately large number of chemical and petroleum
refining companies. In 1988, Louisiana was the second largest generator
of toxic waste in the nation, more than 2 million pounds of toxic waste
were released into its environment per day. Louisiana generated 168
pounds of toxics per person, substantially greater than each of the
next three big generator states: Wyoming generated 96 pounds per
\capita, Utah 81 pounds, and Kansas 70 pounds. This chapter examines 
the distribution of toxic sources in Louisiana and the socioeconomic
1 Hall, Bob and Mary Lee Kerr, 1991-1992 Green Index: A State-by-State 
Guide to the Nation’s Environmental Health, (Island Press, Washington, 
D.C., 1991.
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characteristics of the communities that may potentially be at risk due 
to locational proximity to these sources. One objective is to compare 
the characteristics of the impacted communities with those of the 
general population. Impacted communities are alternatively defined as 
toxic source hosting parishes, zip code areas, and block groups. A 
second objective is to determine whether there is a systematic 
relationship between levels of potential exposure and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of impacted communities.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents summary 
data describing: 1) the total volume of toxic chemical releases
reported by Louisiana facilities in 1987 and 1989; 2) the
characteristics of these facilities, and 3) their geographic 
distribution. Section III presents the socioeconomic characteristics of 
communities surrounding Louisiana’s toxic sources. This section 
provides statistical tests of the following three sets of hypotheses: 
1) the socioeconomic distribution of communities in polluted and 
potentially "at-risk" areas (parish and zip code areas) and the general 
population distribution in Louisiana are identical; 2) potential 
exposure levels and socioeconomic status are independent; and 3) 
proximity of hazard sources and socioeconomic characteristics are 
independent. Section IV presents the conclusions.
II. Toxic Sources in Louisiana
The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI) for the state of Louisiana is the source of 
data on pollution. TRI is compiled by EPA from reports submitted by 
manufacturing facilities on the amount and type of chemical releases 
classified by EPA as being toxic. Approximately 300 specific chemicals
and 20 chemical categories are listed as toxic. The levels of toxicity 
range from acutely lethal to moderately toxic. Appendix A presents the 
criteria used for listing a chemical as toxic and the criteria for 
submitting toxic release information as specified in Section 313, Title 
III of Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA Title 
III).
TRI is a data base with the most comprehensive record to date of 
toxic emissions into the environment. It provides data on toxic 
emissions into the air, releases into the water, underground 
injections, releases on land, and transfers of waste between 
facilities. A facility is required to submit a separate record for each 
reportable chemical. Each record in the data base is uniquely 
identified with a facility. The facility’s location is also uniquely 
identified by latitude and longitude.
The first complete TRI data were published in 1987. It is a 
relatively new data base and has not been used in many empirical 
studies. Most pollution studies reviewed in Chapter 2 used air 
pollution monitoring data which have been in the public domain for over 
three decades. However, TRI is expected to become a widely used 
indicator of environmental quality. Two potential problems associated 
with the data include: 1) it solely relies on self-reporting by
facilities; hence, mis-reporting is likely, and 2) the reported 
quantities are estimated releases not actual releases. For instance, 
some of the estimates are based on measured concentrations of the 
chemical in a waste stream and the volumetric flow rate of that stream. 
Other estimates are based on input and output approach accounting for
accumulation and depletion of the chemical in the equipment. Hence, the
2quality of the data is a function of the estimation technique used.
Table 3.1 presents the breakdown of total volume of toxic 
releases, by medium, into Louisiana’s environment for 1987 and 1989 
reporting years. In 1987, a total of 1896 chemical reporting forms were 
submitted by 239 Louisiana facilities. The total releases and transfers 
from these facilities amounted to roughly 4 million pounds of toxic 
chemicals per facility in 1987. Of this total, approximately 46% were 
injected into underground wells (UNDERGROUND), 21% were released into 
the water (WATER), 15% to land (LAND), 13% into the air (AIR), and less 
than 5% were transfered into publicly owned treatment facilities (POTW) 
and off-site storage, treatment and disposal facilities (TRANSFER). It 
is apparant that most of the toxics generated by the facilities are 
disposed of on-site.
In 1989, a total of 2206 separate reporting forms were submitted 
by 308 facilities. The total releases and transfers from these 
facilities amounted to roughly 1.5 million pounds of chemicals per 
facility. Injections into underground wells and releases into the air 
accounted for over 87% of these total releases. The 1989 reported data 
represent an overall reduction of approximately 55% in total releases 
compared to 1987. Land and water releases declined by approximately 98
2 For a complete assessment of the accuracy of information on toxic 
chemical releases (TRI data base) see Tracking Toxic Substances at 
Industrial Facilities: Engineering Mass Balance Versus Materials
Accounting, Committee to Evaluate Mass Balance Information for 
Facilities Handling Toxic Substances, Board on Environmental Studies 
and Toxicology, Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, 
National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1990.
Table 3.1
Volume of Reported Toxic Releases 
in Louisiana, by Medium 
(in pounds)
MEDIUM 1987 RELEASES 1989 RELEASES % CHANG]
AIR 137,890,534 125,754,407 - 8.80
LAND 154,991,410 3,560,799 - 97.70
POTW 444,109 59,753 - 86.55
TRANSFER 46,974,771 11,098,429 - 79.37
UNDERGROUND 484,950,931 285,933,028 - 41.04
WATER 220,898,404 46,117,634 - 79.12
TOTAL 1,046,150,159 472,524,050 - 54.83
NUMBER OF 
TRI FIRMS
239 308 + 28.87
Source: EPA, Toxics Release Inventory, 1987 and 1989.
and 80 percent, respectively. Air releases, on the other hand, show a
modest reduction of only 9 percent.
The progress in reduction of toxic chemical releases is not unique 
for Louisiana; it is true for the United States as a whole. According 
to the EPA (May 1991), reported releases and transfers of all chemicals 
decreased by 18 percent from 1987 to 1989. EPA acknowledges that half 
of the decrease in land releases may have resulted from facilities’
overestimates of 1987 releases of mineral acids and metal compounds.
The breakdown of 1989 Louisiana releases by industry type is shown 
by 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes in Table 3.2. 
The dominance of the chemical industry in Louisiana is confirmed by the 
reported data. The broadly defined chemical products industry, SIC code 
28, accounted for over 89% of all toxic releases in 1989. The petroleum 
refining industry, SIC code 29, follows with 7% of all releases. Note 
that only manufacturing firms with SIC codes between 20 and 39 are 
required to submit TRI reports. The NA category listed includes
facilities with either SIC codes not specified or SIC code not included 
in 20-39 range.
Table 3.3 presents the distribution of TRI reporting facilities 
and total volume of releases across Louisiana parishes. Ten parishes 
alone accounted for approximately 96% of the state’s 1989 total 
reported releases. Jefferson Parish, with 24 reporting facilities, tops 
the list with over 41% of all releases, followed by Ascension Parish 
with approximately 30%, and Calcasieu and St. James Parishes with 
around 6% each. It is evident that toxic releasing facilities are not 
evenly distributed across Louisiana parishes. Most facilities are
located in the southern portion of the state along the lower
Table 3.2
Industry Type and Share of Louisiana’s Total Toxic Releases 
Ranked by Percentage of 1989 Releases
SIC Code Industry Type % of Total
28 Chemical Products 89.06
29 Petroleum Refining 6.91
37 Transportation Equipment 1.44
26 Paper Products 1.03
34 Fabricated Metals 0.71
33 Primary Metals 0.36
20 Food and Kindred Products 0. 12
36 Electronics 0. 10
24 Lumber and Wood Products 0.09
NA SIC code not available 0.07
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete 0.05
35 Machinery and Computers 0.04
38 Medical Instruments 0.01
30 Rubber and Plastics 0.004
27 Printing, Publishing Products 0.002
25 Furniture and Fixtures 0.002
Source: EPA, Toxics Release Inventory, 1989.
Table 3.3
Distribution of TRI Reporting Facilities and Total 
Volumes of Releases (in pounds) in Louisiana Parishes, 











Jefferson 24 196,107,339 41.5021
Ascension 19 141,675,874 29.9828
St.James 8 26,425,106 5.5923
Calcasieu 22 24,382,431 5.1600
St. Charles 12 19,297,351 4.0839
Ouachita 10 12,750,559 2.6984
East Baton Rouge 23 10,747,197 2.2744
Iberville 13 8,041,717 1.7019
St. Mary 7 5,874,315 1.2432
St. Bernard 4 4,965,501 1.0508
Cameron 3 4,869,520 1.0305
Caddo 18 3,305,334 0.6995
West Baton Rouge 9 2,812,520 0.5952
St. John 10 2,694,230 0.5702
Orleans 13 1,188,182 0.2515
Grant 1 1,108,410 0.2346
Beauregard 4 783,893 0.1659
Evangeline 2 773,351 0.1637
Richland 2 494,150 0.1046
Assumption 3 464,851 0.0984
Rapides 9 411,937 0.0872
West Feliciana 1 395,550 0.0837
Natchitoches 2 381,440 0.0807
Union 1 261,600 0.0554
Plaquemines 6 255,849 0.0541
Sabine 3 233,500 0.0494
Winn 5 227,781 0.0482
(table con’d.)
Lincoln 6 227,413 0.0481
St. Landry 4 167,800 0.0355
Lafourche 6 152,597 0.0323
Livingston 2 136,610 0.0289
Jackson 1 128,980 0.0273
Washington 2 126,360 0.0267
Lafayette 9 121,133 0.0256
Iberia 8 81,474 0.0172
De Soto 3 80,596 0.0171
St. Tammany 4 75,733 0.0160
La Salle 1 75,366 0.0159
Bienville 2 67,440 0.0143
Claiborne 2 47,637 0.0101
St. Helena 1 26,047 0.0055
Acadia 2 20,167 0.0043
Terrebonne 2 19,900 0.0042
Tangipahoa 3 14,151 0.0030
Webster 4 12,457 0.0026
Allen 1 3,000 0.0006
Avoyelles 1 3,000 0.0006
Madison 1 3,000 0.0006
Vermilion 2 2,320 0.0005
Bossier 2 831 0.0002
Red River 1 250 0.0001
St. Martin 2 250 0.0001
Morehouse 1 50 0.0000
Pointe Coupee 1 0 ^.0000
Source: EPA, Toxics Release Inventory, 1989.
Mississippi River. This portion of the state represents a convenient 
location choice for the toxic chemical releasing manufacturing 
facilities that need the waterway for transporting the finished 
products and the nearby oil and gas fields for feedstock and energy. 
All this industrial activity translates into a potential for greater 
exposure to toxic risks in these areas of the state.
III. Community Characteristics
The distribution pattern of toxic sources and releases presented 
above suggests that some parishes and their communities may be 
disproportionately exposed to potential toxic risks. However, we should 
note that these facilities are not distributed evenly within parishes. 
Most of the facilities are located along the Mississippi River. 
Consequently, those communities living closer to the river within the 
parish are more exposed to potential toxic risks than others in the 
same parish. Hence, in studying the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the communities at risk of toxic exposure, to accommodate for 
differences in relative exposure, we use three alternative levels of 
aggregation; parishes, zip code areas, and block groups. The analysis 
of impacted communities is divided into three parts. First, we study 
the characteristics of parish and zip code area communities that host 
TRI reporting firms and determine whether they differ from Louisiana’s 
general population characteristics. Second, we test whether there are 
any spatial associations between socioeconomic status of the population 
and alternative measures of toxic activity. Finally, we test for 
possible distance effects using block group variables.
a. Parish and Zip Code Communities
Louisiana can be alternatively broken down into 64 parishes or 574 
non-overlapping zip code areas. The Sourcebook of County Demographics 
and The Sourcebook of Zip Code Demographics are the sources of 
socioeconomic variables for the parish and zip code areas, 
respectively. TRI reporting facilities are distributed over 55 parishes 
and 153 zip code areas. Merging parish and zip code data with TRI is 
relatively straightforward. Each TRI reporting facility is required to 
provide a physical plant location address, including its zip code and 
the parish where it is located. Over 200 different zip code areas and 
55 parishes were registered for the combined 1987 and 1989 TRI data. 
However, the study of the raw data revealed that some facilities 
reported their mailing or post office zipcode rather than their 
physical location zipcode. A telephone survey of all TRI reporting 
facilities was initiated to verify their location zip code. After the 
corrections were made, the total number of different zipcode areas was 
only 153.
It is reasonable to expect that communities surrounding TRI 
reporting facilities face greater than average potential for toxic 
exposure. The question of interest is whether the socioeconomic status 
of these communities differs from Louisiana’s general population 
characteristics. Table 3.4 describes the socioeconomic variables used 
for the study.
Table 3.5 presents the means of parish (column 1, X ) and zip codep
area (column 2, X ) variables and the statewide means (column 3, u).
Z
The statewide mean is obtained from the 1990 Census of Population. 
Parish populations are approximately 5 times greater than those of
Table 3.4
Description of Socioeconomic Variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
POP Total Population
HSHLD Total Number of Households
WHITE Percent Population, White
BLACK Percent Population, Black
MEDINC Median Household Income
AVGINC Average Household Income
CAPINC Per Capita Income
INC A % Families, Income Less Than $10,000
INC B % Families, Income Between $10,000-14,999
INC C % Families, Income Between $15,000-24,999
INC D % Families, Income Between $25,000-34,999
INC E % Families, Income Between $35,000-49,999
INC F % Families, Income Between $50,000-74,999
INC G % Families, Income More Than $75,000
EDUC Median Years of Education
COLLEGE Percent Population, College Graduates
HOME Median Home Value
RENT Median Rent
Sources: The Sourcebook of County Demographics, 1990.
The Sourcebook of Zip Code Demographics, 1990.
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Table 3.5
Population Characteristics in 
TRI Reporting Parishes and Zip Code Areas
PARISH ZIP CODE STATE TESTS OF HYPOTHESES t-stat 
MEAN X MEAN X u X = X X = p X = pp z p z p z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLE
POP 73,560 14,426 4,497,128 3. 99a -
(13,736;) (1,059)
HSHLD 29,981 4,984 1,572,889 3.98a -
(5,902) (370)
WHITE 70.29 68. 16 70.50 0.62 -0. 12
(1.77) (1.67)
BLACK 28.61 30.34 27.70 -0.49 0.50
(1.81) (1.69)
MEDINC 22,243 23,861 24,096 -1.29° -2.55a
(726) (527)
AVGINC 26,455 27,608 28,445 -1.09 -3.30a
(603) (452)
CAPINC 8,979 9,399 9,949 -1. 16 -4.88a
(199) (164)
INC A 26.25 23.81 22.70 1.36° 3.32a
(1.07) (0.72)
INC B 10.71 10.30 10.20 0.93 2. 12a
(0.24) (0.20)
INC C 18.71 18.61 18.80 0.20 -0.35
(0.26) (0.25)
INC D 15.80 16.66 16. 40 -1.53° -2.00a
(0.30) (0.26)
INC E 15.92 17.05 17.05 -1.07 -1.74b
(0.62) (0.44)
INC F 8.90 9.54 10.20 -0.73 -2.60a
(0.50) (0.37)
INC G 3.87 4.04 4.70 -0. 40 -4.15a
(0.20) (0.20)
EDUC 11.66 12.40 12.20 -1.00 -5.40a
(0.10) (0.64)
COLLEGE 10. 12 11.00 13.70 0.77 -6.07a
(0.59) (0.55)
HOME 35,326 38,336 43,036 -1. 18 -5.36a
(1,439) (1,107)
RENT 173 187 214 -1.32c -6.73a
(6) (5)

















Significance at 5 percent level. 
Significance at 10 percent level. 
''Significance at 20 percent level.
typical zip code areas. This is, of course, expected since zip code
areas are geographically smaller and therefore less populated. We 
utilize the zip code data in order to capture any variations that might 
exist within the parish but dissappear in parish aggregates. Visual 
inspection of the sample means in Table 3.5 columns (1) and (2) reveals 
some differences between parish and zip code level data. For example, 
the percentage of blacks in TRI reporting zip code areas is slightly 
higher than the percentage of blacks in TRI reporting parishes; the
opposite is true for percentage of whites. Parish sample means of
median household income, average household income, and per capita
income seem to be slightly lower than the zip code sample means.
To determine whether these observed differences are statistically 
significant, we calculate a t-statistic based on the null hypotheses 
that the parish and zip code sample means are equal. For each variable 
in Table 3.5, we calculate the difference between the parish mean (X )p
and the zip code mean (X ). Then we calculate the standard error for
Z
the difference of the means, S- - , according to the followingX X p z
f ormula:
(3.1) S- x - x P z n
2 2where s and s are the parish and zip code sample variances p z
respectively, and n and n represent the number of observations forp z
each sample. The t-statistic is then calculated as follows:
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X - X
(3.2) t = — g- -p-
x - x
P z
The calculated t values are listed in column (4) of Table 3.5. The
tests, at 5 percent level of significance, resulted in rejecting the
equality of sample means for population (POP) and number of households
(HSHLD). At the 20 percent level of significance, however, we reject
the equalities of sample means for median income (MEDINC), percent
families with incomes below $10,000 (INC A), percent families with
incomes between $25,000 and $34,999 (INC D), and median rent (RENT).
These tests suggest that there are no substantial differences between
parish and zip code communities.
We arrive at different conclusions when comparing parish and zip
code sample means, X and X , to the state’s benchmark values, p. The
p z
characteristics of the population in TRI reporting zones appear to be 
different from the state’s general population characteristics. All 
income and income related variables, such as education and property
values, have higher statewide benchmark values than either parish or 
zip code sample means. To determine whether these observed differences 
are statistically significant, we compare the mean values of parish and 
zip code variables (X and X ), separately, with the benchmark values
p z
(p) by computing a t-statistic based on the null hypotheses that the 
values are equal. The t-statistic is calculated as follows:
(3.3) t = *  M
x
where X is the sample mean and S- is the standard error of the mean.x
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.5 present the calculated t values for
parish and zip code samples, respectively. For the parish level 
variables, the tests at the 10 percent level of significance or higher, 
resulted in rejecting the null hypotheses for nearly all income 
variables. In other words, income distribution in TRI reporting 
parishes are statistically different from Louisiana’s benchmark values. 
The mean values of median household income (MEDINC), average household 
income (AVGINC) and per capita income (CAPINC) are all significantly 
lower in TRI reporting parishes than the state averages. The mean 
percentages of families with incomes below $15,000 (INC A and INC B) 
are higher in these parishes, and the percentages of those with incomes 
above $35,000 is significantly lower (INC E, INC F and INC G). Other 
income related parish level variables reveal significant divergences 
from state benchmarks. The mean values of median years of education 
(EDUC), the percent of the population that is a college graduate 
(COLLEGE), median home values (HOME), and the median rent (RENT) are
all significantly lower in TRI reporting parishes. Race variables 
represent an exception in that there are no observed differences in 
parish and statewide racial distributions.
The divergences from the state benchmarks appear to be of a 
smaller magnitude for the zip code level variables. The tests, at 5 
percent level of significance, resulted in rejecting the null 
hypotheses for CAPINC, INC G, COLLEGE, HOME, and RENT. On average, 
compared to the state, TRI reporting zip code areas have lower per
capita incomes, fewer families with incomes greater than $75,000, fewer 
college graduates, and lower home and rent values. The null hypothesis
of equality of AVGINC is rejected at the 10 percent level of
significance. The difference between zip code and state racial
composition is greater than that between parish and the state as a 
whole. The mean percent black in the TRI reporting zip code areas is 
30.34% which is above the state’s benchmark of 27.7%. The null 
hypothesis of equality is rejected at the 20 percent significance 
level. It is interesting to note that income variables show less 
divergence and race variables more divergence with lower degrees of 
geographic aggregation. The significance of divergent racial 
distributions becomes more evident when we consider block groups, the 
lowest level of aggregation, below,
b. Community Characteristics and Toxic Exposure
Is potential exposure to toxics in Louisiana systematically 
related to socioeconomic characteristics of the community? We address 
this question by examining the correlation coefficient between 
alternative measures of potential toxic exposure and the socioeconomic 
variables introduced above for both parish and zip code area 
communities. Note that this approach is not intended to explain cause 
and effect relationships, it merely shows the degree of spatial 
association between the two sets of variables. Nevertheless, the 
findings do provide an additional insight into the characteristics of 
the communities surrounding the toxic sources.
Table 3.6 presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between 
1989 total annual toxic releases (TOTAL), per capita annual releases 
(TRI-PC), number of TRI reporting facilities (FIRMS) and socioeconomic 
variables at both parish (columns 1-3) and zip code (columns 4-6) 
levels. TOTAL, TRI-PC, and FIRMS are used as proxies for potential 
toxic exposure. The larger the volume of releases, both total and per
Table 3.6
*Correlation Between Socioeconomic Variables And 














POP ,423a .001 .710a . 138b -.113 ,214a
HSHLD . 401a -.009 .689a .110 -. 113 .203a
WHITE . 157 .054 .031 -.053 -.128 -.114
BLACK -. 170 -.047 -.050 .047 . 129 .089
MEDINC .326a .302a .585a .018 .012 . 124
AVGINC .302a .262b ,594a -.014 -.042 . 120
CAPINC .313a . 164 .644a -.068 -.092 .060
INC A -.31la -.230b -.547a -.044 .055 -.143b
INC B -.316a -,253b -.521a -.021 -.073 -.082
INC C -. 197 -.409a -.351a .056 -,166a .016
INC D ,251b .078 ,307a . 151b . 125 -.009
INC E .381a .422a ,536a .057 .063 . 160
INC F .271a .371a .568a -.055 -.034 . 112
INC G .117 .049 .494a -.110 -.155b .037
EDUC .227b . 155 .505a -.017 -.008 .008
COLLEGE . 128 -.099 .498a -. 110 -.052 -.081
HOME ,357a .243b .600a -.009 -.055 .047
RENT . 321a .066 ,584a -.002 -.196a . 123
Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
Significance at 5 percent level. 
Significance at 10 percent level.
capita, and the greater the number of firm in a given geographic area, 
the higher the potential for exposure to toxic chemicals.
At the parish level, total toxic releases (TOTAL) and total number 
of firms (FIRMS) are positively and significantly (at 5 percent level) 
related to median household income (MEDINC), average household income 
(AVGINC), and per capita income (CAPINC). Per capita toxic releases 
(TRI-PC) is also positively related to the income variables, although 
less significantly. All three measures of potential toxic exposure
reveal the same relationship with income distribution variables. While 
the percentages of families in the two lower income classes (incomes 
less than $15,000) are negatively related to total releases, the
percentages in middle and upper middle classes (incomes between $35,000
and $75,000) are positively related. These positive relationships 
between incomes and potential exposure levels are not consistent with
3findings reported in other pollution studies. Usually, the
relationships between these two sets of variables are found to be 
negative. However, we are not alarmed with the findings because the 
variables used as proxies for exposure also describe the intensity of 
the industrial activity in a parish, a relatively large geographic 
area. Toxic releases are by-products of industrial activity. Higher 
releases indicate higher production levels and higher production may 
translate into more jobs and higher incomes. Although income levels in 
TRI reporting parishes are, on average, lower than the state’s overall 
benchmarks, among TRI reporting parishes incomes are higher in parishes
3 See Freeman (1972), Asch and Seneca (1978), Brajer and Hall (1992).
with more facilities and higher levels of discharges. More industrial 
activity may generate higher incomes, or may require higher labor 
compensation to attract workers. Our findings are consistent with those 
of Napton and Day (1992).
The wealth enhancing feature of industrial activity at the parish 
level is further evidenced by the relationships between total number of 
firms and other income related variables. Median years of education and 
percentage of population with a college degree are positively and 
significantly related to the number of firms. Median home values and 
median rents tell a similar story. Race variables, on the other hand, 
do not have any significant association with the potential exposure 
variables.
We obtain a very different picture when calculating correlation 
coefficients between alternative measures of potential exposure and 
socioeconomic variables in TRI reporting zip code areas. Table 3.6 
reveals few significant associations between the two sets of variables. 
For example, the, rental value of housing is negatively related to per 
capita toxic releases, with the correlation coefficient of RENT 
significant at the 5 percent level. The percentage of families in the 
highest income class (INC G) is negatively and significantly related to 
TRI-PC. It is interesting to note that at this lower aggregation level 
the signs of the correlation coefficients are consistent with other 
pollution studies. For instance, the percentage of blacks (BLACK) is 
positively related to all measures of potential exposure. AVGINC and 
CAPINC are negatively related to TOTAL and TRI-PC. However, these 
relations are not significant.
TRI related industrial activity may be income enhancing at high 
(parish) aggregation levels due to spillovers or need for compensating 
wage differentials due to hazards or quality of life. However, it may 
also be related to depressed "localized" pockets observable only at the 
lower (zip code) aggregation levels,
c. Community Characteristics and Distance
Exposure to toxics is assumed to be, among other things, a 
function of distance from pollution sources. The closer a community is 
to a pollution source, the higher the risk of potential exposure. Block 
groups are geographically much smaller than either parishes and zip 
code areas. Therefore, block group data provide high resolution 
information about communities immediately adjacent to toxic polluters. 
Block groups are used to test for possible localized distance effects 
on the community’s social and economic make-up. Distances of block 
groups from their nearest polluting facilities are calculated and used 
as the basis for identifying spatial differences in community 
characteristics and potential exposure levels.
The Census of Population and Housing, 1990: Summary Tape File A 
(STF-A) is the source of the block group data. A block group consists 
of a cluster of blocks having the same first digit of their three-digit 
identifying numbers within a census tract or block numbering area. 
Block groups generally contain between 250 and 550 housing units, with
4the ideal size being 400 housing units. The STF-A provides data on the 
population distribution in a block group by race, age and sex. It
4 U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Populat ion and Housing, 1990: 
Summary Tape File A, Appendix A.
provides data on total housing units and distribution of housing units 
by race, ownership, housing values, and rental values. The only 
limitation of t,he STF-A is the fact that it does not provide 
information on income and education.
In order to use STF-A, we need to associate the information it 
provides with the TRI data. TRI data do not have block group specific 
information on facility locations. Fortunately, STF-A provides a set of 
latitude and longitude coordinates that identify the center of each 
block group. This allows us to construct a data base that provides 
distance specific information about the characteristics of communities 
that may be exposed to potential toxic risks. The development of a data 
base that identifies communities based on their distance from TRI 
reporting facilities is one of the major contributions of this 
research. Using the latitudes and longitudes of TRI sources and STF 
block groups, we calculate a matrix of distances between each of the 
307 Louisiana facilities that reported toxic releases in 1987 or 1989 
and the 8,055 block groups in Louisiana. This is a 307 x 8055 matrix of 
distances which is used to link sources to communities. Appendix B 
explains the procedure used for the distance calculations.
In order to capture possible distance effects, communities are
classified into eleven distinct distance groups, C through C . The
procedure for classifying communities requires an examination of the
distances between each block group and all 307 TRI reporting
facilities. Using the distance matrix described above, we identify the
distance between each block group and its nearest TRI facility. We then
keep the distance variable and use it as community identification
factor. C defines all block groups that are located within a distance j
of and d miles of TRI reporting facilities. It is expected that 
exposure potential will eventually diminish with distance. We 
arbitrarily choose ten miles to be the maximum distance. One mile
intervals are used to define the community groups C through C , C
represents the block groups that are located more than 10 miles from 
the nearest TRI source.
Is proximity to toxic sources in Louisiana independent of a 
community’s social and economic status? To answer this question, we 
calculate the means of various socioeconomic variables for community 
groups through C and test whether there are any statistical
differences between them. Table 3.7 describes the socioeconomic 
variables used in the analysis and explains the community group
definitions in detail. Table 3.8 presents the sample means for each 
variable. Community groups are listed in column (1): C represents
those block groups that have the nearest TRI firm within a distance of 
one mile; represents the block groups that have the nearest TRI firm 
within a distance of at least one and at most two miles; etc. The total 
number of block groups (N) for each community category is listed in 
column (2). Of the 8,055 total block groups in Louisiana, 6,116 are 
located within a distance of 100 miles from TRI reporting facilities.
Of which, 5,297 are located within a distance of 10 miles. C has the2
highest number of block groups. The number of block groups falls as we 
go further from TRI facilities. However, over 52% of the block groups 
in Louisiana are located within a distance of 5 miles from the nearest 
TRI reporting facility.
The mean population in a community group, column (3), shows a 
general decreasing trend as the distance to the nearest facility
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Table 3.7 





















Percent Population, 15 Years Old and Below
Percent Population, 62 Years Old and Above
Median Home Value
Median Rent
Block Groups located 0-1 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 1-2 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 2-3 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 3-4 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 4-5 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 5-6 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 6-7 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 7-8 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 8-9 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Block Groups located 9-10 miles from Nearest TRI Facility 
Block Groups located > 10 miles from Nearest TRI Facility
Table 3.8
Community Characteristics Given Distance to TRI Reporting Facilities
COWUHITY N FOP DENSITY WHITE BUCK OTHER FEMALE YOUNG OLD HOME RENT
C1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ’ (10) (11) (12)
Cl 755 753 4,457 57.88% 40.29X 1.847. 52.71% 24.71% 16.76% *55,253 *259
(21) (179) (1.39) (1.41) (.13) (.17) (.28) (.33) (997) (4)
Cz 1.354 730 4,646 60.72 37.56 1.72 52.63 24.27 16.06 62,840 270
(16) (131) (0.99) (1.00) (.10) (.13) (.21) (.24) (1,135) (3)
C3 1,055 748 4,038 65.35 32.92 1.73 52. 13 24.48 15.63 61,990 271
(18) (144) (1.04) (1.05) (.09) (.15) (.24) (.29) (1,009) (4)
c* 629 728 1,955 75.37 23.31 1.32 51.72 25.27 14.65 59,853 269
(26) (109) (1.21) (1.22) (.14) (.17) (.29) (.38) (1,072) (6)
Cs 379 654 1,248 75.99 22.69 1.32 51.54 26.76 13.42 57,434 245
(31) (92) (1.51) (1.51) (.22) (.23) (.33) (.43) (1,698) (7)
C6 310 623 867 78.29 20.69 1.02 51.19 27.00 13.77 52,907 225
(36) (78) (1.53) (1.53) (.17) (.22) (.38) (.46) (1,298) (7)
C7 256 ‘ 640 805 75.69 23.38 0.93 51.08 27.66 13.20 49,896 201
(38) (85) (1.79) (1.79) (.14) (.27) (.37) (.44) (1,546) (6)
Cs 232 581 474 74.08 24.89 1.03 51.39 27.65 14.24 47,295 201
(33) (72) (1.96) (1.98) (.16) (.28) (.38) (.49) (1,540) (7)
Cs 187 489 595 78.72 20.56 0.71 51.49 26.36 16.12 44,452 178
(32) (99) (2.11) (2.12) (.11) (.44) (.50) (.62) (1,492) (5)
Cio 140 626 372 80.44 18.76 0.79 50.79 26.36 15.44 47,386 178
(45) (64) (2.03) (2.04) (.12) (.35) (.50) (.69) (1,679) (6)
Clt 819 539 505 74.77 23.81 1.41 51.23 26.34 • 16.26 40,979 165
(21) (41) (0.99) (1.00) (.13) (.16) (.21) (.25) (654) (2)
OVERALL1 6,116 681 2,744 68.52 29.99 1.48 51.94 25.38 15.47 55,636 240
(8) (52) (0.43) (0.43) (.04) (.06) (.09) (.11) (405) (2)
anova f2 11.61 142.81 32.70 29.75 5.45 10.43 16.30 9.31 38.09 71.9
K-W H3 161.75 2,089 272.33 237.62 250.10 305.35 177.73 152.30 581.45 937.9
Standard errors in parentheses.
Cl is 0-1 miles, Cz is 1-2 miles, etc., C u  is greater than 10 miles. 
This represents the total sample.
2Fisher’s F-statistic.
'Vruskal-Wallis H-statistic.
increases. On average, more people live closer to TRI facilities than 
further away. This is further evidenced by the values of the mean 
population density (DENSITY) in column (4). A wide range of variation 
is observed for DENSITY, with the highest values reported in C . The 
variable shows a decreasing trend with distance. This finding indicates 
that industrial activity in Louisiana is highly concentrated in densely 
populated areas. There are reasons to expect that industrial activity 
would induce nearby population growth, and industries would tend to 
locate near population centers for labor supply purposes. However, the 
implication is that population exposure to environmental risks is also 
higher due to this location pattern.
The racial composition of the community changes with distance,
columns (5)-(7). The percentage of blacks in the population (BLACK) is
highest in communities that live within a distance of one mile from
toxic sources. While the overall percentage of blacks in the study
areas, C C , is 29.99%, the mean value in C is 40.29%.l n  l
Furthermore, the mean values of BLACK in communities within 3 miles of 
the nearest TRI facility (C - C ) are significantly greater than the 
percentage of blacks in the state as a whole, 27.7% (Table 3.5, column 
3). The data clearly show that the percentage of blacks systematically 
falls as distance increases. The lowest value of 18.76% for this 
variable is reported in communities that live between 9 and 10 miles 
from the nearest TRI facility. The percentage of whites in the 
population (WHITE) shows the opposite relation, as one would expect 
since the percentage of other minorities constitute a small percentage 
of Louisiana’s overall population.
Distance is also related to the sex and age composition of the 
community. The percentage of females (FEMALE) ranges from 52.717. in C 
to 50.797. in C . Inspection of column (8 ) shows a modest but steady
decline with distance. The percentages of young people (YOUNG), ages
below 15, show an increasing trend with the lowest value of 24.477. 
reported in and the highest value of 27.66 reported in C . The
percentages of older persons (OLD), ages 62 and above, show a
decreasing trend over a limited distance range, with percentages 
ranging from a high of 16.767. in C to a low of 13.27. in C .1 7
The means of median home values (HOME) and rents (RENT) show
variations across the defined communities. As one would expect these 
two averages seem to move in the same general direction. While HOME has
its highest value in C , RENT reaches its highest in C . The data
indicate that home and rent values are generally higher in communities 
that are located closer to the toxic sources. This finding appears to 
be inconsistent with studies that predict property values to be lower 
in areas of lower environmntal quality. However, TRI facilities are 
mostly located in urban and densely populated areas. The distance to a 
facility may be acting as a proxy for the distance to the central 
business district used in property value studies. The closer the 
property is located to the central business district, the higher its 
value. Therefore, the relationship is not necessarily inconsistent.
The natural question is whether these observed differences can be
attributed to chance, or whether they are indicative of actual
differences among the means of the corresponding populations. If z ,
z , ... , z are the true mean values of the variables In each2 k
community, we want to test the null hypothesis z = z^= ... = z against
the alternative hypotheses that they are not all equal. Two statistical 
approaches are used to explore these hypotheses. First, we use one way
analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA assumes that the data can be
treated as random samples from a normal populations having the same 
variance and differing, if at all, only in their means. Formally, the 
ANOVA model is represented as follows:
(3.4) z = z + a + ei j i i j
where i = l,2 ,...,k community classes, and j = 1 , 2 n block groups.
This model assumes that any observed value can be decomposed into three 
parts:
1. An overall mean, z, obtained by treating all community classes as 
though they constitute a single sample.
2. A deviation associated with community classes, a., where a = z -
j  ’ i ’ i
z , z being the mean of the variable in the ith class, i i
3. A random element from a normally and independently distributed
population, e = N(0,cr). i j
ANOVA provides a single test of the null hypothesis that the mean of 
the k community classes are equal. The variance ratio
(3 5 ) p Mean square among community classes
Error Mean Square
is considered to,be a good criterion for testing the null hypotheses. 
The value of F is 1 when the null hypothesis holds, and is larger when 
the class means differ significantly. The test of significance is 
performed by comparing the value obtained for F with critical values of
54
F. The null hypotheses are rejected at a level of significance if the 
calculated F > F (k-l,N). The calculated F statistics for our sample of 
block group communities are presented in Table 3.8 (ANOVA F). According 
to these values the observed differences in the class means cannot be 
attributed to chance. The tests for each socioeconomic variable 
resulted in rejecting the null hypotheses at the 5 percent level of 
significance or higher.
The F-test is very specific about the assumption of normality. Our 
sample of over 6 , 0 0 0 observations could be treated as a random sample 
from a normal population. However, to make sure that the results are 
statistically significant we use a second approach to test the same 
hypotheses. A nonparametric alternative to Fisher’s ANOVA is the 
Kruskal Wallis H-test. Unlike ANOVA, this test does not require the 
assumption that the samples come from a normal distribution and have 
equal variances. The H test is based on the statistic
The k classes are ranked as though they constituted a single sample. Ri
is the sum of the ranks assigned to the n observations in the ithi
sample, and N = ju^n. • If the null hypothesis is true, the sampling 
distribution of H is approximated by a Chi-Square distribution with k-1 
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is rejected at the significance 
level a if H > x" (k-1 d.f.). Table 3.8 presents the values of the H 
statistic calculated for our sample. According to these values, we are 
able to reject the null hypotheses at the 5 percent level of 
significance, or higher, for all socioeconomic variables.
Regression models in which each of the variables listed in Table 
3.7 is a quadratic function of the precise distance of the block group 
to the nearest TRI reporting facility provides further evidence of the 
above relationships. Table 3.9 presents the regression results obtained 
from the following model:
(3.7) z = oc + |3x + vx2 + e
where z is the block group specific socioeconomic variable (BLACK,
HOME, OLD, etc.); x is the distance measured to the nearest 0.01 mile;
and e is a normally distributed error term.
The explanatory power of the individual regressions in Table 3.9,
— 2as measured by the value of R , range from a low of 0.026 for OTHER to 
a high of 0.1486 for DENSITY. All coefficient estimates have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant. The results basically 
confirm that as distance from the nearest TRI facility increases, 
population, population density, the percentage of blacks, other 
minorities, females, and elderly decrease. The percentage of whites and 
young children increase, and median home and rent values decrease as 
the distance increases.
IV. Conclusions
Toxic chemical releasing facilities are not distributed evenly 
across Louisiana. Most TRI facilities are conveniently located in the 
southern portion of the state along the lower Mississippi River. 
Jefferson and Ascension parishes alone accounted for over 70% of 
Louisiana’s total toxic releases in 1989. The distribution pattern of 









POP 771.51 -22.41 0.38 0.0163 51.72
(12.76) (3.10) (0 .1 1 )
DENSITY 4,814.56 -573.96 13.98 0.1486 534.52
(80.32) (19.53) (0 .6 8 )
WHITE 59.78 2.65 -0.08 0.0382 121.45
(0.71) (0.17) (0 .0 1 )
BLACK 38.51 -2.59 0.08 0.0355 113.66
(0.71) (0.17) (0 .0 1 )
OTHER 1.72 -0 . 06 0.001 0.0026 8.92
(0.07) (0 .0 2 ) (0.0006)
FEMALE 52.76 -0.25 0.008 0.0169 53.53
(0 .1 0 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0.0008)
YOUNG 24.25 0.31 -0.007 0.0141 44.78
(0.15) (0.04) (0 .0 0 1 )
OLD 15.88 -0 . 16 0.007 0.0030 10. 19
(0.19) (0.04) (0 .0 0 1 )
HOME 64,017 -2,140.09 41.00 0.0465 150.27
(663.53) (161.31) (5.61)
RENT 286.02 -11.75 0.23 0.0919 310.33
(2.50) (0.61) (0 .0 2 )
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Number of Observations: 6,116.
disproportionately exposed to potential toxic risks, assuming that 
toxic releases represent potential environmental risk to the 
communites. This chapter tested whether the characteristics of the 
population in TRI reporting areas were different from Louisiana’s 
general population characteristics. Our analysis showed that income 
levels (median household income, average household income, and per 
capita income), on average, were significantly lower in TRI reporting 
parishes and zip code areas. Furthermore, the percentage of families 
with incomes below $10,0 0 0 was significantly higher and the percentage 
of families with incomes above $50,000 was significantly lower in TRI 
reporting areas. Other income related variables such as education and 
property values were also lower than the state averages.
This chapter tested whether potential exposure to toxics in 
Louisiana is systematically related to socioeconomic characteristics of 
the community. The evidence examined indicates that TRI related 
industrial activity may be income enhancing at the parish level. The 
correlations between income variables and alternative measures of 
potential exposure are consistently and significantly positive, 
indicating that income levels are higher in parishes with greater total 
discharges, greater per capita discharges, and more TRI facilities. 
Similar relationships are revealed between potential exposure measures 
and other income related variables such as property values and 
education. These relationships, however, are not evident at the zip 
code level. Our analysis suggests that potential exposure to toxics in 
zip code areas may be distributed regressively. Per capita discharges 
are negatively correlated with the percentage of families in the 
highest income class and positively correlated with the percentage of
the families in the lowest income class. A strong negative association 
is also found between per capita discharges and the median rental value 
of housing.
The relationships between alternative measures of potential toxic 
exposure and race are not strong at high levels of spatial aggregation. 
The percentage of blacks is negatively correlated with parish level 
exposure data and positively correlated with zip code level, with the 
correlation coefficients statistically insignificant. However, an 
interesting trend is observed for the race variable with lower levels 
of spatial aggregation. While the racial composition of the population 
in the TRI reporting parishes, the highest aggregation level, is 
statistically the same as the general population’s, the percentage of 
blacks in TRI reporting zip code areas is slightly higher. Using 
distance specific information on local communities around the toxic 
sources, the lowest aggregation level, we found that the percentage of 
blacks in communities living within a three mile distance to the 
nearest TRI facility is significantly above the state’s average. 
Generally, as distance from the nearest pollution source increases, the 
percentage of blacks in the community decreases and the percentage of 
whites increases, which suggests that blacks, more than whites may be 
disproportionately exposed to potential toxic risks in Louisiana. We do 
not use dispersion models of pollutants, so the distance-exposure 
relation may not be exact.
Overall, our findings indicate that proximity to toxic sources is 
not independent of a community’s social and economic status. Most toxic 
sources are located in urban and densely populated areas. Relatively 
more elderly people and more females live in the immediate proximity of
toxic sources. As distance from the nearest toxic releasing facility 
increases, the percentage of older people, ages 62 and above, and the 
percentage of females in the community decreases. On the other hand, 
the percentage of young people, ages below 15, increases as distance 
increases. Finally, property values are relatively higher in the 
immediate proximity of toxic releasing facilites, with the values 




Research indicates that environmental risks are not evenly 
distributed across the population. "Community Exposure" models suggest 
that low income and minority groups are disproportionately exposed to 
poorer environmental quality conditions (Freeman, 1972; Ash and Seneca, 
1978; Brajer and Hall, 1992; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1983). The 
previous chapter also presented evidence of systematic relationships 
between alternative pollution exposure measures and community 
charactersitics. These findings raise the question whether there is a 
persistent set of forces, perhaps resulting from the normal optimizing 
behavior of individuals, businesses, and government, that may lead to 
"disproportionate" exposure. Residential and industrial location 
choices of household and firms may help explain why some neighborhoods 
bear relatively higher exposure burden than others. However, the 
environmental control behavior of firms and the response behavior of 
communities to the environmental stressors may also be critical in 
determining the distribution of environmental risk.
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This chapter develops a public choice theoretic model that 
captures the relationship between hazard production behavior of a 
profit maximizing firm and the socioeconomic characteristics of 
communities surrounding the firm. The model assumes that the firm’s 
location decisions were determined by product and input market 
conditions as well as transportation costs, regulatory environments and 
public services available. An attempt is made to model the firm’s 
behavior apart from location decisions. The production process is 
assumed to generate both a marketable product and negatively valued 
by-products, pollutants. The firm is assumed to maximize profits by 
establishing the optimal amounts of output and hazard production.
Communities surrounding the firm are the recipients of the
negative externalities. The model assumes that individual households in 
the community choose consumption to maximize utility subject to budget 
constraints. Since pollution represents a potential hazard or a source 
of disutility, consumers may respond by expending "efforts" to
compensate for or to reduce the potential hazard. In turn, the behavior 
of the affected consumers is expected to have an effect on the
pollution control behavior of the profit maximizing firm. In
anticipation of the community response which could translate into 
potential cost such as increased regulatory burden, the firm may find 
it profitable to increase expenditures on pollution control in order to 
reduce hazard levels and, thereby, reduce the potential governmental or 
community opposition.
The proposed model provides several important insights which will 
be applied to the empirical study of the environmental hazards 
distribution. The model will be used to empirically test whether the
environmental control behavior of toxic chemical releasing firms are 
related to socioeconomic characteristics of surrounding communities. 
For example, would firms’ decisions to reduce environmental risks, 
through reductions in toxic discharges, be related to a community’s 
racial and economic status?
This chapter is organized as follows: section II presents the
consumer/household model; section III presents the firm model; section 
IV presents the equilibrium model and section V presents the 
conclusions.
II. Consumer Behavior
Consider the behavior of an individual household who chooses 
consumption to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Living 
at a location I, d miles from a pollution source, the household, after 
ex-post realization of potential or actual hazards, adjusts consumption 
such that some of the budget may be allocated to remedy the situation. 
The household could choose from several options for remedial actions:
1. Change location (mobility)
2. Insulate the house (adaptation)
3. Organize and demand strong regulations (advocacy)
4. Demand punitive damage awards (litigation)
The response behavior depends on household’s constrained utility 
maximization decisions. Socioeconomic, cultural and psychological 
constraints determine the household’s opportunities and costs of 
decisions.
The propensity for mobility is a function of personal
characteristics as well as opportunities, income, and the 
transferability of human capital. Economically well endowed individuals
have more options for leaving a polluted area to a better environment 
or have the financial ability to avoid lower ambient environmental 
quality in their neighborhood by taking vacations, insulating their 
homes, or by installing pollution reducing devices.
If propensities for mobility are low, for social, economic or
cultural reasons, individuals may resort to organizing and demanding a
better quality Of life. Regulatory initiatives are driven by the
public’s efforts to enhance quality of life. Communities organize and
form opposition groups if the expected payoff is positive. The expected
payoff to each member of the group is different, and is a function of
individual perception of the imposed risk as well as the cost of
effecting change. A perception of the harmful effects of the chemicals
they are exposed to is an important determinant of advocacy. It is
postulated that the likelihood of active participation in the
opposition is directly related to personal efficacy and resource 
1availability. Personal efficacy deals with the individual’s
perceptions of his or her abilities to affect the social and/or
political environment. High efficacy individuals are more likely to 
become politically involved than low efficacy individuals (Orum, 1974; 
Smith et al., 1980).
Let r represent the remediation efforts available to the
household. In response to the realized hazard h, the household’s
objective is to maximize the utility function U(y,c) where y represents
a composite bundle of all consumption goods with U > 0 , and cy
Mohai, Paul, "Public Concern and Elite Involvement in 
Environmental-Conservation Issues", Social Science Quarterly, Volume 
6 6 , Number 4, December 1985, 820-838.
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represents the environmental "disamenity" or the impact of net hazard 
after all remediation efforts with U < 0. Subscripts denote
C
derivatives. The household chooses y and r to maximize:
(4.1) max U = U(y,c)y, r
s.t. I = P y + P r , and y r
c = c(h,r)
where I is the income level, P is the price of composite good y, and 
P is the price of remediation efforts. The environmental disamenity 
c(h,r) is assumed to be an increasing function of the hazard level, ch
> 0 , and a decreasing function of the remediation efforts, c < 0 .r
Normalizing P to 1 without loss of generality, the first order y
conditions for a household’s objective function in (4.1) are
U - A = 0 y
(4.2) U c - AP = 0c r r
I - y - P r  = 0r
where A is the Langrange multiplier. The second order conditions
require that the bordered Hessian determinant be positive, or
(4.3) IH | = 2P U c - (U c2+ U c ) - U P2 > 0.1 c 1 r yc r cc r c rr yy r
The subscript in IH I is included in order to differentiate the1 C 1
consumer model Hessian determinant from the firm model’s that will be
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introduced later in this chapter. Assuming that the second order 
conditions for utility maximization are satisfied, that is, assuming 
that preferences are regular strictly quasi concave in y and r, the 
optimal solutions to the system of equations in (4.2) are given by
(4.4)
y*= y(P , I, h)r
r = r(P , I, h)r
* •*where y and r represent the household’s demand for consumption goods 
and remediation efforts, respectively, at a given location, 1. The 
first-order conditions reveal that y and r are chosen such that the 
marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio:
U  c M U
(4.5) M R S  = .c, r = \7ji~ = Pr,y U M U  ry y
where U c and U represent the marginal utilities of remediationc r y
effort and consumption respectively. Figure 4.1 illustrates consumer
equilibrium graphically, with condition (4.5) satisfied at the point of
tangency between the indifference curve U| and the budget constraint1 h
facing the household.
Several questions are of immediate interest to this research.
Primary among them is the impact of changes in the level of hazards 
present in the community on the household demand for remediation 
efforts. Before exploring this issue, and to facilitate later 






Consumption Equilibrium at Location 1 and Hazard Level h
a. Income Changes
The impact of a change in household income on the level of 
remediation effort is found by substituting the optimal solutions from
(4.4) into the first order conditions in (4.2), and totally 
differentiating the system of equations with respect with respect to I. 
Solving using Cramer’s Rule yields a description of the exogenous 
income effect:
* r -i
(4.6) = - n r V  U c - P U > 0o i  I c l L cy r r yyJ
where |H I > 0 from the second order conditions; c < 0 ; P > 0 ; U < 01 c 1 r r yy
assuming diminishing marginal utility; and U = 0  depending on thecy <
relationship between c and y. It is reasonable to assume that r is a 
normal good; in fact, environmental activism is usually assumed to be a 
luxury good. As income level increases, the household’s willingness and 
ability to expend efforts for enhanced environmental quality will also 
increase. If U < 0 (c and y are substitutes) which is intuitivelycy
easy to see, then the expected relationship between r and I will hold 
*and Sr /SI will be positive; or if U = 0 (c and y are independent),cy
then Sr /SI will also be positive.
High income individuals pose the greatest cost on the polluting
firm. They are the ones with the greatest access to lawyers and
2politicians and may claim the greatest damage awards. Research
2 It is also possible that people view the legal process as a lottery 
with high gains, and may engage in frivolous suits for high damage 
awards.
confirms that "environmental activists tend to be drawn 
disproportionately from the upper-middle class." (Mohai, 1985, p. 821). 
One explanation for this trend could be that low income groups have 
always been exposed to relatively poorer physical conditions so they 
are less aware that they live in polluted environment and breathe
3polluted air. However, it should be noted that upper middle class 
involvement in environmental issues may be due to factors other than 
taste differences. Research has shown that environmental quality
' 4deterioration lowers the property values in the affected areas. In
fact, a study by Gianessi, Peskin and Wolff (1977) concluded that in
terms of per capita damage costs of pollution, high income groups
suffered the greatest damages. Hence, a higher degree of concern and
increased effort to enhance environmental quality is observed.
b. Remediation Price Changes
To analyze the impact of a change in own-price on the amount of
remediation effort undertaken, substitute the optimal solutions in the
first order conditions and totally differentiate with respect to P ,
r
solve using Cramer’s rule and get
<4'7) ' = [ » + r [ V -  -
Taylor, Dorceta E. , "Blacks and the Environment: Toward an
Explanation of the Concern and Action Gap Between Blacks and Whites", 
Environment and Behavior, Volume 21, Number 2, March 1989, 175-205.
4 Nelson, Jon P., "Airport Noise, Location Rent, and the Market for 
Residential Amenities", Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 6 , 1979, 320-331. Frankel, Marvin, "Aircraft Noise and
Residential Property values: Results of a Survey Study", The Appraisal 
Journal, Volume 59, Number 1, January 1991, 96-110.
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Insert the income effect from (4.6) for the second term in (4.7),
(4.8) SrSP H - r
Sr
SI < 0
The first term in (4.8) is the substitution effect of a price change; A
= U > 0  from the first order condition and therefore the substitution y
effect is negative as expected. The second term is the income effect of 
the price change. If remediation effort r is a normal good, or if c and 
y are independent or substitutes (U £ 0), then the income effect iscy
positive and r would have a downward sloping demand curve, that is
SrVsP < 0.r
c. Hazard Level Changes
When the level of observed hazard changes, the household is 
expected to respond. Differentiating (4.2) with respect to h, and 
solving the system yields
(4.9) SrSh P C T  ['U c c  + U c  - P U  ccc r h c rh r yc h I
To sign Sr /Sh, we need to sign the bracketed term. Totally
differentiating MRS (4.5) with respect to h yields the followingr,y
dMRS
(4.10) r,y
IJ U  c c + U  c - U  U  c cy cc r h c rh c yc r h
dh U




U c c + U c  - P U cU cc r h c rh r ycy J
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Substituting (4.9) for the term in the brackets
dMRS 1 3r(4.12)
dh U y
Signing (4.12) is therefore equivalant to signing
* U dMRS
(4.13) ydh dh
MRS represents the amount of good y the household is willing to give r. y
up to obtain an additional unit of r, such that it will maintain a 
constant level of satisfaction. Assuming that greater hazard increases 
the consumer’s relative willingness to tradeoff consumption for 
remediation, the MRS will also increase and the indifference curve
U|h in Figure 4.2 will rotate and become steeper. From the diagram it 
is clear that the household will consume more r and less y, the demand 
for remediation effort is therefore expected to increase with the level 
of hazard yielding the positive sign in (4.13).
d. Taste Changes
In order to evaluate taste effects on consumer behavior, introduce 
a shift parameter a which alters household’s preferences for 
environmental quality. Higher values for a signify stronger tastes for 
environmental amenities or stronger dislike for disamenity c. 
Differentiating (4.2) with respect to a following the procedures 
outlined above yields
*






Consumption Equilibrium Adjustment to Increased Hazard
Stronger taste for environmental amenities will change MRS just asr i y
increased hazard does. Totally differentiating MRS with respect tor,y
a, and making the necessary substitutions yields
dMRS f
(4. 15) ---- = — i—  U c c  + U c - P U c, U I cc r CC c r(X r yc hda y L
The sign of (4.15) is expected to be positive assuming that stronger
taste for environmental amenities increases the consumer’s relative
willingness to tradeoff consumption for remediation. The consumer will
sacrifice more y for an extra unit of remediation as a increases.
III. Firm Behavior
Consider a profit maximizing competitive firm producing a
marketable product x. A negativly valued by-product of x is hazard h.
The production technology can be described implicitly by J(x,h,z,a) =
0 , where z is the production input and a is the hazard abatement input.
Assume the production technology is separable into the product
production function x(a,z) and the hazard production function h(a,z).
Since the marketable product x and hazard h are joint products of the
production input z, then it is plausible to expect that as the firm
employs more of z, the production of x and h will increase
simultaneously; hence, x > 0 and h > 0 .  Holding abatement effortz z
constant, hazard increases as output increases. Since h is a 
nondesirable output or a negative by-product, abatement input is 
defined as one that reduces the hazard output, (h < 0). On the othera
hand, no a priori restrictions are placed on the derivative of product 
output with respect to the abatement input, (x =0). It is possiblea <
> 0
for the abatement input to augment or hinder the production of 
marketable product x. For instance, if the hazard produced is waste 
heat, the abatement input is a heat-exchanger and the production input 
is fuel oil, then as a increases more waste heat is recaptured for use 
in the production of x. Hence, the marginal product of a in the 
production of x is positive (x >0). Alternatively, if h is smoke, a 
is an electrostatic precipitator and z is electricity, then a requires 
electricity to remove the particulates from stack emissions. Hence, 
input a diverts electricity away from production of x and the marginal
5product of a in the production of x is negative (x < 0 ).a
The firm is required by law to contain the level of hazard it
produces, within a given time period, to a specific amount. Assuming
that pollution standards are perfectly enforceable, if the level of
hazard produced by the firm exceeds the maximum allowable limit, then
penalties and/or taxes will be imposed. Let C(h,r) represent the total
non-compliance cost of hazard production. Hazard produced is, of
course, equivalent to hazard not abated. Generally it is expected that
any fine or penalty will be a positive function of the size of
violation such as strict liability for damages, and the total cost of
non-compliance will be increasing at an increasing rate as the hazard
level increases. Hence, It is assumed that C(h,r) is an increasing
convex function of h; that is, dC/dh = C > 0  and 32C/Sh2 = C > 0 .h hh
Aside from the direct cost of non-compliance, the firm confronts 
an indirect cost associated with hazard production. The firm
The example and the basic framework presented are from Martin 
(1986).
acknowledges the possibility that the household’s remediation efforts 
could translate into public or regulatory opposition, the cost of which 
could take the form of additional regulatory burden such as higher 
penalties, stringent enforcement actions, and/or tighter standards on 
hazard production. Households’ remediation efforts could take the form 
of law suits, requiring the firm to incur defense costs or punitive 
damage awards. Thus, the risk neutral profit maximizing firm is assumed 
to account for possible responses by nearby residents. C(h,r) is 
assumed to be an increasing convex function of r (C > 0  and C =; 0).' r rr
Furthermore, C is assumed positive. This is consistent with thehr
discussion above; since an increase in households’ remediation efforts 
could result in increased regulatory burden, it is expected that 
marginal cost to the firm of hazard non-abatement will increase with r.
In light of the discussion above, the firm’s decision on the 
optimal product and hazard output involves maximization of the profit 
function with respect to z and a. The risk neutral firm’s objective 
function is given by
(4.16) max 7i = P x - P z - P a -  C(h,r)z , a z a
s. t. x = x(a,z)
h = h(a,z)
where P is the market price of product x assumed to be exogenous to the 
firm, P is the price of the production input z, P is the price of theZ 01
abatement input a, C(h,r) is the total non-compliance cost of hazard 
production.
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The maximization requires that the following first order 
conditions be satisfied
(4.17)
7T = P x  - P - C h  = 0z z z h z
7T = P x  - P - C h  = 0a a a h a
The second order conditions for profit maximization are
(4.18)
•re = Px - C h2- C h < 0,zz zz hh z h zz
n = P x  - C h2 - C h <0,aa aa hh a h aa
n = P x  - C h h - C h  =0, andza za hh z a h za <
IHI = to n - nZ > 01 1  zz aa za
Assuming that the second-order conditions are satisfied, the optimal
* * solutions to (4.16) are z = z(P,P ,P ,r) and a = a(P,P ,P ,r), wherez a z a
* *z and a are the production and abatement input demand functions,
respectively. The first-order conditions reveal that the firm chooses z 
and a such that the marginal rate of technical substitution between 
abatement input and production input equals the ratio of marginal input 
costs:
x P + C h
(4.19) a a h a
x z P + C hz h z
The marginal cost of abatement input a in the production of x is equal 
to its price, P , plus the reduction in marginal non-compliance cost
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realized by abatement, -C h >0. The marginal cost of the productionh a
input z in the production of x is equal to its price, P , plus the
Z
marginal non-compliance cost incurreded by increased hazard output, 
C h >0.h z
* *Substituting z and a into the product production function and 
hazard production function, we get the optimal production levels
* * #(4.20) x = x(z , a )
* # *(4.21) h = h(z ,a ).
System of equations (4.20) and (4.21) can be used to derive 
comparative statics results describing firm behavior. Although several 
questions may be of interest, primary among them is the effect of 
households’ remediation effort on the optimal hazard produced by the 
firm.6 The impact of changes in households’ remediation efforts on the 
firm’s hazard production or hazard control behavior is obtained by 
totally differentiating (4.21) with respect to r which yields
(4.22) = h _|£ + hdr z Sr a Sr
where h > 0 and h < 0 by assumption. The effect of changes in
Z d
★household remediation efforts on optimal input demands, Sz /Sr and
* # *Sa /Sr, are obtained by substituting z and a into the first order
Comparative statics on all exogenous variables is performed in 
Appendix C in order to facilitate later discussions.
conditions (4.17), totally differentiating the system of equations with 
respect to r, and solving by implementation of Cramer’s rule to get
where |H| is the determinant of the profit Hessian, |H| > 0, and Ch > 0 
by assumption. The second order conditions imply that the collective 
sign of the bracketed terms is negative (since it can be shown that the
optimal hazard level will fall as household remediation effort 
increases in a locality. The firm may respond by increasing 
expenditures on pollution control or reducing production scale to 
reduce the hazard level in the community and, thereby, reduce community 
opposition.
IV. Equilibrium Remediation Efforts and Hazard Level
In equilibrium both households and firms are maximizing utility 
and profits, respectively. The observed outcome will be a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium if the household maximizes utility based on the assumption 
that the hazard level produced by the firm is invariant with respect to
(4.23)
(4.24)
h n -h 7i = 0
h tt -h 71a zz z az
z aa a az <
Substitute (4.23) and (4.24) into (4.22) to obtain
*
(4.25) dh h2n - 2h h n + h2?r < 0dr z aa z a za a zz
bracketed term is negative definite quadratic form). 7 Hence, the
7 This is demonstrated in Appendix C.
its own remediation efforts, and the firm maximizes profits based on 
the premise that the household’s decision to expend remediation effort 
is invariant with its own hazard production decision. A Stackelberg 
outcome will be observed if at least one party (possibly both) will 
behave assuming that his or her behavior will alter the behavior of the 
other party. This section presents an analysis of the possible outcomes 
using both the Cournot and the Stackelberg formulations and compares 
the results.
a. Cournot-Hash Equilibrium
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is observed when each party maximizes its 
objective function under the assumption that the response of the other 
party is fixed. An alternative "Nash" view is that each party attempts 
to find the best response to the other agent’s action. Mathematically, 
the equilibrium values of hazard h and remediation effort r are the 
solutions to the following system of equations
(4.26) r - r* (h,I,P ) = 0r
(4.27) h - h*(r,P,P ,P ) = 0z a
Equation (4.26), the household’s reaction function, gives a 
relationship between r and h with the property that for any specified 
value of h, the corresponding value of r maximizes household’s utility. 
The properties of (4.26) have been established in section II. Equation
(4.27), the firm’s reaction function, gives a relationship between r 
and h such that for any value of r, the corresponding value of h 
maximizes the firm’s profit. The properties of (4.27) have been 
established in the preceeding section of this chapter. The equilibrium
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solution is a pair of values for r and h which satisfy both equations 
simultaneously.
The Jacobian of the system is found by differentiating each 










/• * \  rflr dh 1
Sh J[ dr J > 0
The sign of (4.28) is clearly positive since Sr /Sh > 0 from (4.13) and 
*dh/dr < 0 from (4.25). Since the Jacobian does not vanish, an
equilibrium solution exists and these solutions are r = r(P ,I,P,P ,P )r z a
and h = h(P ,I,P,P ,P ). Figure 4.3 presents the Nash equilibriumr z a
graphically.
Equilibrium values r and h change when the parameters of the model 
change. Substituting r and h in the system of equations (4.26) and
(4.27), differentiating with respect to the parameter of interest, and 
solving using Cramer’s Rule yields the comparative statics results 
summarized below,
i. Household Income Changes
The impact of a change in household income is given by
(4.29) 51 * I 51
(4.30) 5h51 o r ( ¥ ) ( ¥ ) < °
In the consumer model above, it was shown that when household income
*increases, the demand for remediation efforts increases, that is 5r /5I
Figure 4 .3 
Nash Equilibrium
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> 0 from (4.6). Hence, when income level increases, the household’s
* * reaction function r (h) in Figure 4.3 shifts upward and as a result r
increases and h decreases.
ii. Remediation Price Changes
The impacts of a change in the price of remediation effort, P , onr








d h  ■ >  0dr
The signs of the above equations are established using (4.8). When the
price of remediation effort increases, the household’s reaction 
#function r (h) in Figure 4.3 shifts downward and as a result the 
optimal level of r decreases and h increases,
iii. Taste Changes
The impact of a change in household preferences for environmental 
quality, a, on equilibrium r and h are given by
(4-33> - H -  - > 0
< 0
Stronger taste for environmental amenities indicates an upward shift in 
the household reaction function using (4.15). The result, of course, is 
a decreased hazard production and increased remediation.
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iv. Output Price Changes
Following the procedure outlined above, the impact of product 
price changes on optimal remediation effort and hazard level are given
by
(4.35) = |J r 1f_^L) [JlL3P ' I dP dh
(4.36) 3h = |jri dhap dP
where dhdP rL- [2PC 1 \n[HP L h. L P2 + n P2 - 2n P Paa z zz a za z a
P2 |7r x2 + 7t x2 - Zn x x I I aa z zz a za z a |
C2171 h2 + 71 h2 - 2?r h h h I aa z zz a ] I | 0za z a I <
(see Appendix C (C.6-C.11) for derivation). The sign of dh /dP depends
on the collective sign of the terms in brackets, {.}. The second order
conditions imply that the first set of terms in brackets is negative,
the second set is positive, and the third set is positive. Although the
above expression has an indeterminate sign, it is nevertheless expected
to be positive. When the price of marketable product x increases more x
will be produced (see Appendix C (C.5) for details). Since x and h are
joint products, it is expected that h will also increase as the price
of the output increases, holding everything else constant.
*Consequently, a sufficient condition for dh /dP > 0 is that the
absolute value of the first term must be less than the absolute value
of the sum of the second and third set of terms. The firm’s reaction 
*function h (r) is expected to shift rightward when the price of
marketable product x increases. Hence, an increase in both r and h.
v. Input Prices Change
The effect of a changes in price of abatement input a and
production input z on r and h are given by
(4.37) Sr 3 P
I 11 -l dh
lJ l " d r  rh
(4.38) Sh I T,-i dh-  M lSP dP
(4.39) SrSP = J
-l dh 
~dFr
(4.40) ShSP Ml dP
*
where ^ h n - h n 1 = 0 , andd P z  M l  L z  aa  a J  I
dh
dP H |h 7iL a 2
h n z za § °
(See Appendix C for derivation). The signs of (4.37)-(4.40) clearly 
depend on n since n and tc are negative by the second orderza zz aa
conditions for profit maximization, and h > 0 and h < 0 byz a
assumption. If n s 0, that is z and a are substitute or independent 
inputs, then the expected signs of (4.37) and (4.38) are positive and
those of (4.39) and (4.40) are negative. That is, when price of input a 
increases, the firm’s reaction function h (r) in Figure 4.3 shifts to 
the right and as a result r and h both increase, and when price of 
input z increases, the firm’s reaction function shifts to the left and 
both r and h decrease.
The comparative statics results clearly indicate that both 
households and firms respond to each other’s behavior. For instance, a 
change in household income triggers a change in both remediation effort 
and hazard reduction effort. However, it may seem inappropriate to 
assume Cournot type solution for this particular environmental problem 
since "environmental activism" implicitly implies that the household 
feels that it can make a difference and the firm recognizes that its 
environmental control behavior will impact the community and cause 
reactions. If equilibrium is expected to be reached through a sequence
of finite adjustments, the hazard level produced by the firm will
induce the community to adjust the level of remediation effort, which
in turn (depending on the mode of remediation effort: mobility,
adaptation, advocacy, or litigation) will prompt the firm to adjust 
control behavior, and so on. It is rather unlikely that each party will 
assume that its decisions do not effect the other party’s behavior if 
each of the adjustments is immediately followed by a reaction on the
Q
part of the other party.
Q
Daughety (1985) considers Cournot by endogenizing the conjectural 
variations and letting the model determine them instead of assuming the 
ad-hoc behavior, setting up an infinite regress problem, he presents "a 
purely static model that generates the Cournot equilibrium without 
reference to conjectures or quasi dynamics."(p. 368). He proves that 
Cournot equilibrium is consistent in the ’as if’ sense.
Nash equilibrium might not be observed if at least one party 
(possibly both) will behave assuming that his or her behavior will 
alter the behavior of the other party. If the household assumes the 
role of the leader, then it will maximize utility taking the firm’s
reaction function into consideration. If the firm, on the other hand, 
assumes the role of the leader, then it will maximize its profits
subject to the household’s reaction function. Basically, a Stackelberg 
equilibrium is observed when one of the parties chooses to play Cournot 
while the other plays consistent conjectural variations. The following 
section presents one possible Stackelberg equilibrium,
b. Stackelberg Equilibrium
A von Stackelberg equilibrium is observed when either the firm or 
the household behaves assuming that its behavior will alter the 
behavior of the other and builds the conjectural variation into the 
marginal conditions. In the following analysis, the firm is assumed to 
behave as the leader and the household as the follower. The household 
maximizes utility by adjusting r given the hazard level produced by the 
firm. In this model, the household adapts Cournot behavior and follows 
its own reaction function (4.26). The firm, on the other hand, does not
follow its own reaction function (4.27), instead maximizing profit
given the household’s marginal adjustments implied by the reaction 
function (4.26). 'The firm’s profit function is given by
(4.41) max n’ = P x - P z - P a -  C(h,r)z , a z a
S.t. X = x(a,z)
h = h(a,z)
r = r*(h,I,P ) r
The notations are as defined previously with the exception that the 
firm’s profit function now includes the household’s response to the 
realized level of hazard. The firm anticipates the reaction of 
household and, therefore, incorporates this reaction in the profit 
maximizing decision. The first order conditions for profit maximization 
are:
Tt’ — Px - P - (c  + C -4r-]h = oz z z  ̂ h r oh J z
(4.42)
n’ = Px - P - fc  + C h = 0a a a  ̂ h r oh J a
Assuming that the second-order conditions are satisfied, the optimal 
solutions to (4.42) are z = z(P,P ,P ,r*(.)) and a = a(P,P ,P ,r*(.)).z a z a
Substituting z and a into the product production function and hazard 
production function, we get the optimal production levels
(4.43) x= x(z ,a )
(4.44) h = h(z ,a ).
The optimal hazard production level in Stackelberg equilibrium is 
expected to be lower than in Cournot equilibrium. The first-order 
conditions reveal that the firm chooses z and a such that the marginal 
rate of technical substitution equals the ratio of marginal input 
costs:
*"
p + C + C r ha h r h a
#
P + C + C r hz h r h z
* *
Note that = 3r /3h. The above relationship can be directly compared 
with (4.19). Since the firm implicitly incorporates the possible 
household reaction to the level of hazard it produces, the marginal 
cost of abatement input a in the production of x (the numerator in
(4.45)) is lower than its counterpart in (4.19) by the amount of 
*C r h . The marginal cost of the production input z in the productionr h a
of x (the denominator), on the other hand, is higher by C r h . Ther h z
marginal rate of technical substitution between a and z is lower here
(4.45) than in the previous case (4.19). This indicates that the 
production process will be relatively more abatement intensive than 
would be the case if the firm did not consider household responses. The 
amount of input z the firm hires will depend on x .a
The firm in Stackelberg model will employ relatively more of the 
abatement input a than in Cournot model because, for a given z, the 
marginal benefit of hazard abatement or the marginal cost savings from 
hazard abatement is higher under Stackelberg formulation. Figure 4.4 
illustrates the difference between the two. The marginal cost of 
abatement input is given by MC. Under both Cournot and Stackelberg 
models, MC is given by Px - P . MB is the marginal benefit of hazarda a C
abatement under Cournot. MB is equivalent to C h . MB is the marginalC h a S
benefit of hazard abatement under Stackelberg. MB is equivalent to 
* ^
C h + C h . The firm employs a level of abatement input in Cournoth a r d h a  r  J r
equilibrium, and a > a in Stackelberg equilibrium. As a result, the 
hazard production by the firm is lower in Stackelberg equilibrium, 
given h < 0 .a
Figure 4.4
Abatement Input Employment in Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibriums
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Equilibrium hazard, h, changes when the parameters of the model 
change. Totally differentiating (4.44) with respect to the parameter of 
interest yields the comparative statics results summarized below,
i. Household Income Changes
The impact of a change in households income on the firm’s hazard 
production or hazard control behavior is given by
(4.46) dh _ 9z 9a~dl z ~dl~ + alTT
9z/5I and 9a/9I, are obtained by substituting z and a in the first 
order conditions (4.42), totally differentiating the system of 








H’ fc + C r*] r*+ C r* 1 [h n’ - h n’ 1I hr rr hi I r hll I z aa a azl
—  [fc + C r*l r*+ C r* 1 fh n’ - h n’| H  j hr rr hj I r hlj [ a zz z az
Substitute (4.47) and (4.48) into (4.46) and get
(4.49) dhdl H’ fc + C r*lr*+ cr*l fh27r’ - 2h h n’ + h V  1< 0I hr rr hi I r hll I z aa z a za a zzl
where |H’ | > 0  is the determinant of the profit Hessian. The first 
bracketed terms in (4.49) is positive since C > 0 and C > 0 byhr rr
assumption, r^ >,0 from (4.13), rj > 0 from (4.6), and r is expected 
to be positive. The collective sign of the second bracketed terms is 
negative as implied by the second order conditions. Thus as household
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income increases the firm recognizes the possibility of increased 
threat of opposition by the community and responds by reducing the 
hazard level. The firm may respond by increasing expenditures on 
pollution control or reducing production scale to reduce the level of 
hazard in the community and, thereby, reduce community opposition. It 
is possible that the firm will reduce hazard production even below the 
maximum allowable limits if the threat of opposition is sufficiently 
high. In a dynamic, intertemporal context the firm may see exceeding 
standards now as a means to placate the community and avoid stricter 
standards in the future,
ii. Remediation Price Changes
Following the above outlined procedures, the impact of a change in 
price of remediation is given by
(4.50) dhdP H’ *1'hJ
* *C + C r r + C rhr rr h | P r hP r r
h27r’ - 2h h n’ + h2z aa z a za a-•Izzl > 0
* *The sign of (4.50) is expected to be positive since r = 9r /dP < 0 ̂ Pr r
*from (4.8) and r is expected to be negative. This is of coursehPr
intuitively correct, when price of remediation effort increases, r 
decreases and the threat to the firm goes down. The firm responds by 
increasing hazard production.
V. Conclusions
Several important insights are obtained from the above analysis. 
It is apparent that the usual optimizing behavior of firms and 
households does explain to a certain extent the distribution of 
environmental risk across communities. The polluting firm’s hazard
production behavior is modelled as being responsive to the political 
influence of the local populations. Ability and willingness of 
households to pursue remediation to alleviate or compensate for the 
environmental disamenity is shown to have a direct effect on the 
environmental control behavior of firms. The firm acknowledges the 
possibility that the household’s remediation efforts could translate 
into public or regulatory opposition, the cost of which could take the 
form of additional regulatory burden such as higher penalties.
The income effect is specifically clear. Assuming that 
environmental activism is a normal good, as income level increases, the 
household’s ability to expend efforts for enhanced environmental 
quality also increases. Which in turn, prompts the risk neutral profit 
maximizing firm to increase expenditures on pollution control and avoid 
any possible regulatory burden. The household’s reaction to a change in 
cost of remediation, the price effect, is also clearly illustrated. The 
demand for remediation effort is inversely related to its own-price.
Willingness of households to pursue remediation is a function of 
the actual hazard level they are exposed to. As the level of observed 
hazard increases, the demand for remediation also increases. The 
individual firm’s control behavior may also be a function of the total 
number of other polluting firms in the area. Higher releases of toxics 
in the community' either from the firm in question or from other firms 
in the proximity may trigger opposition. It is expected that as the 
number of firms increase in the community, the willingness of people to 
voice opposition will increase, and to avoid regulatory burdens 
individual firms may increase abatement efforts.
Stronger tastes for environmental amenities also increases the 
demand for remediation. How do we measure tastes for environmental 
amenities? Membership in environmental advocacy groups is often used as 
an indicator of involvement in environmental issues. Research indicates 
that such groups draw their support mostly from the upper-middle class 
(Mohai, 1985). Differences in black/white involvement in environmental 
issues have also been observed over time. Research indicates the 
existence of both a "concern gap" and an "action gap" between blacks 
and whites (Taylor, 1989). The concern gap is explained partially by 
socioeconomic status and hierarchy of needs. Environmental issues are 
assumed to be luxury items that can be attended to only after more 
pressing basic needs are satisfied. The action gap is explained by 
political inefficacy, failure to recognize advocacy channels, and low 
level of political participation.
If the firm’s pollution control behavior is a function of the 
political activism of the communities, then hazard production levels 
would be greater in neighborhoods with predominantly low income and 
black populations.
Chapter 5
Evidence on Recent Toxic Level Changes
I. Introduction
Since 1987 there has been a significant reduction in toxic 
releases to the environment. Between 1987 and 1989, reported releases 
and transfers of all toxic chemicals in the United States decreased by 
about 18 percent (EPA, 1991). In the same period, Louisiana reported an 
overall reduction of 54.8 percent (Chapter 3, Table 3.1). If toxic 
releases represent potential environmental risk to communities, then 
reductions in those releases represent a potential improvement in 
risks. This chapter attempts to explain the observed reduction in toxic 
discharges and concomitant toxic risks between 1987 and 1989 in the 
State of Louisiana.
The theoretical model presented in the previous chapter indicates 
that community characteristics and activism may impact the behavior of 
the polluting firms; releasing potentially harmful chemicals triggers 
community opposition and, therefore, a discharger response to this 
opposition. Firms have a profit motive to reduce pollution when 
community opposition increases regulatory and compliance cost. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a direct test of the hypothesis
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that environmental control behavior of toxic releasing firms are 
related to the socioeconomic characteristics of surrounding 
communities. The central question is whether or not changes in 
potential exposure to toxic risks are nondiscriminatory, that is, 
whether toxic discharge reductions are statistically related to the 
socioeconomic makeup of affected communities.
This chapter is organized as follows: section II specifies the
empirical model; section III presents the estimation results, and 
section IV presents the conclusions.
II. Empirical Models
a. Model Specifications
Maintaining the hypothesis that community characteristics and 
activism does impact the behavior of polluting firms, we propose to 
estimate two types of discharge reduction functions: collective, and
individual. The collective discharge reduction function refers to 
aggregated reductions in toxic releases by all firms within a defined 
geographic area. The individual discharge reduction function refers to 
reductions in toxic releases by individual firms at each given 
location.
By specifying these two types of discharge reduction functions, we 
hope to sort out how community characteristics affect individual and 
collective firm behavior. The theory presented in the previous chapter 
illustrates why community characteristics are a factor in explaining 
the behavior of a firm or a collection of firms that release toxic 
chemicals. Given the theoretical consideration, the following empirical 
model is specified.
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(5. 1) ARELEASE = a + a RELEASE + a FIRMS + Y 0 Z + c1 2 87 3 i i i
where the dependent variable, ARELEASE = RELEASE - RELEASE , is the89 87
simple arithmetic difference between 1989 toxic releases and 1987 toxic 
releases. RELEASE^ is included in the model as an explanatory variable 
to control for initial level of releases. We expect its coefficient to 
be negative, due to lower marginal cost of control for facilities with 
high initial releases or due to high control benefits in the form of 
lower penalties. Vector Z includes the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the communities exposed to the potential environmental risks. Z is 
included in the model to determine the effects of neighborhood factors 
in explaining discharge reductions; and e is the normally distributed 
error term. FIRMS is defined as the total number of toxic chemical 
releasing firms in the locality and is included in the model to control 
for the level of industrial activity in the area. It is reasonable to 
expect that an area heavily populated by toxic releasing facilities 
will be an obvious target to any regulatory initiative. Therefore, we 
might expect the coefficient of FIRMS to be negative; i.e., discharges 
are expected to be reduced by a greater magnitude when the total number 
of toxic releasing facilities increases in an area, due to the ’hot 
spot’ phenomenon. However, it is also possible that firms believe they 
can avoid regulatory burdens by simply keeping a low profile as the 
number of firms increases. In this case, discharges will be reduced by 
a smaller magnitude, and the coefficient of FIRMS will be positive,
i. Parish and Zip Code Level Analysis
The dependent variable in the collective discharge reduction
function is the difference in toxic releases aggregated over all
facilities in a given geographical area. Parishes and Zip Code areas 
are used to represent alternative geographic aggregation levels. At the 
parish level, ARELEASE is calculated by taking the change in total 
reported releases in a given parish. Only those parishes that report 
releases in both years, 49 out of 55 reporting parishes, are considered 
in the parish level empirical estimation. The variable FIRMS represents 
the total number of toxic releasing facilities located in each parish; 
and vector Z represents parish population characteristics. Vector Z 
includes population density (DENSITY), percentage of the population 
that is black (BLACK), median family income (INCOME), median home value 
(HOME), percentage of population that is a college graduate (COLLEGE), 
and the ratio of registered to eligible voters in the parish (REGVOTE).
At the zip code level, the dependent variable is calculated by 
aggregating discharges of all facilities that reported releases in both 
years, 112 out of 153 reporting zip code areas. FIRMS represents the 
total number of toxic releasing facilities in each zip code area. 
Vector Z represents zip code area population characteristics. It 
includes all variables used in parish level analysis with the exception 
of the ratio of registered to eligible voters (REGVOTE) since zip code 
areas do not represent individually identifiable political 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, population (POP) is substituted for DENSITY 
because zip code areas do not have easily defined area measurements,
ii. Firm Level Analysis
The dependent variable in the individual discharge reduction 
function is the difference in toxic releases for individual facilities 
that reported releases in both 1987 and 1989, 157 out of 308 reporting 
facilities. Vector Z represents the socioeconomic variable describing
the characteristics of communties based on their proximity to these 
individual facilities. Vector Z in the individual discharge reduction 
model is constructed from data at the block group level. Block group 
level data have one limiting factor; they do not provide information 
about income levels in the community. The variables included in Z are 
population density (DENSITY), percentage blacks (BLACK), median home 
value (HOME), percentage females (FEMALE), and percentage of population 
62 years old and above (OLD).
It is reasonable to expect that communities living closer to toxic
releasing facilities are the ones most affected by an adverse
environmental condition. They are the ones that have the most to gain 
from environmental improvement, although, perhaps, the most to lose in 
terms of possible negative emloyment impacts. In order to obtain the 
characteristics of proximate communites and capture possible
neighborhood factors in explaining discharge reductions by individual 
firms, circles of increasing radii are drawn around each facility and 
the characteristics of the communities that live within the circle are 
aggregated and used as explanatory variables. The smallest circle has a 
radius of one mile; the size of the circle is increased by increments 
of one mile, and the largest circle has a radius of five miles.
Communities living at a distance of zero to two miles from a polluting 
firm are likely to be most vulnerable to the toxic emissions, and are 
likely to be most relevant to the polluting firm’s pollution control 
decisions. Hence we expect a greater response by the firms to nearby 
communities than to more distant communities. As the size of the circle 
increases, the level of community aggregation increases and we expect 
that aggregated community characteristics would have less impacts on
firm behavior. The largest circle considered has a radius of five 
miles, representing a fairly large geographic area.
In order to capture incremental effects of neighborhood factors on 
the firm’s pollution control decisions, we also estimate a modified 
model in which communities are classified into two groups based on 
their distance fpom the pollution source. The circle with the five mile 
radius delineated for each facility is transformed into a circle with 
two rings. Ring 1 represents the immediately impacted communities 
living within a distance of two miles from the pollution source; and 
Ring 2 represents the distant communities living within a distance of 
at least two and at most five miles from the source; The modified model 
is:
(5.2) ARELEASE = ot. + a RELEASE + Y (3 FIRM + T Y d> Z + e1 2: 87 r r r it ir
where r = Ring 1 and Ring 2, and i = ith socioeconomic variable. FIRMl
and FIRM2 represent the number of polluting firms in Ring 1 and Ring 2 
respectively. Individual ring community characteristics are included in 
vector Z. We expect that distant community effects will be different 
from proximate community effects in explaining the observed reductions 
in discharges, i.e., we expect stronger response by the firms to Ring 1 
communities than to Ring 2 communities,
iii. Discharges by Type of Emission
The collective and individual discharge reduction functions are 
estimated for three discharge sources using (5.1) and (5.2). The Total 
Model represents the aggregated discharge reduction function in which 
the change in total toxic releases is used as the dependent variable.
Total releases include emissions into the air, releases into the water, 
underground injections, releases to land, and transfers of waste 
between facilities. The Air Model represents the air discharge 
reduction function where the change in air releases is used as the 
dependent variable. The Land Model represents the land discharge 
reduction function where the change in land releases is used as the 
dependent variable.
We expect communities to react differently to alternative types of 
risk sources. Air and land releases are more visible than total 
releases, and air releases may be more spatially dispersed than land 
releases. Community response is expected to be strong when the threat 
of potential exposure is highly visible or spatially concentrated. The 
firm’s discharge control behavior is expected to reflect the response 
behavior of the community. We expect strong "local" community 
opposition to land discharges because the impact of these discharges 
are highly localized. The impact of air releases, on the other hand, is 
not only felt by communities living in the immediate proximity of the 
firm, but also by those living further away. Hence, we expect strong 
"spatially aggregated" community opposition to air discharges,
b . Data
Several data bases are used in this study. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory, 1987 and 
1989, is the data source on toxic discharges and is described in 
Chapter 3 and Appendix A. Parish level socioeconomic variables are 
obtained from The Sourcebook of County Demographics, 1990; data on
eligible voters in Louisiana are obtained from the Census of Population 
and Housing, 1990: PL-94.171 Reapportionment and Redistricting Data for
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the State of Louisiana; and data on registered voters in the state are 
obtained from the Louisiana Department of Elections and Registration.
The Sourcebook of Zip Code Demographics is the source of zip code level 
variables, and the Census of Population and Housing: 1990 Summary Tape 
File A is the source of block group level data used to construct 
distance specific information (see Appendix B).
c. Estimation Technique
Multiple regression wass selected as the appropriate statistical 
tool because of its ability to control for many factors in the 
analysis. All specified linear models are estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares. Although detecting and treating econometric problems are 
not the main purposes of this study, the potential problems of 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are examined and accounted for 
whenever possibld.
Multicollinearity occurs when there is a linear relationship among
some or all explanatory variables of a regression model. In the
presence of high or perfect multicollinearity, it becomes difficult, if
not impossible, to disentangle the separate influences of each
independent variable. If a moderate degree of multicollinearity is
present, the regression coefficients, although determinate, possess
large standard errors, which means that the coefficients cannot be
estimated with great precision. Several rules of thumb are suggested to
detect the presence and degree of multicollinearity in a given data
2set. For instance, if the coefficient of determination, R , is high and 
the F test rejects the hypothesis that the partial slope coefficients 
are simultaneously equal to zero, but the individual t-tests show that 
none or very few partial slope coefficients are statistically different
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from zero, then multicollinearity is a problem. High pair wise
correlations among the regressors is also a signal of the presence of
multicollinearity. Another procedure to detect the problem is to
regress ejach of the independent variables on the other regressors. If 
2the value of R in the auxiliary regressions is high, a near exact 
linear dependence among the explanatory variables is indicated.
A moderate to strong degree of multicollinearity was detected in 
our data using SAS diagnostic option COLLIN based on the work of 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980). The sole purpose of our analysis is 
establishing whether or not a relationship exists between community 
characteristics and the behavior of polluting firms. We are not overly 
concerned with precise estimates of the parameters, but rather their 
significance. Multicollinearity may result in the rejection of 
significance of a relation when, in fact, the relation exists. 
Estimates will be biased if a relevant variable is omitted and 
inefficient if a nonrelevant variable is included. The extent of the 
bias depends on the degree of the correlation between the misspecified 
variable and the ̂ variables with significant coefficients.
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the condition of constant variance 
in the disturbance term, e, is violated. The problem of 
heteroskedasticity often occurs in cross-sectional studies. In fact,
"in cross sectional data involving heterogeneous units, 
heteroskedasticity may be the rule rather than the exception" 
(Gujarati, 1988, p. 327) This study involves the relation between
l For a detailed discussion on multicollinearity see Gujarati (1988), 
pp.283-309, and Judge et al. (1988), pp. 859-886.
reductions in discharges and socioeconomic characteristics. 
Heteroskedasticity is expected since small, medium, and large size 
firms are sampled together. Several methods of detecting 
heteroskedasticity are available. The simplest of which is the 
graphical method. Using this approach, the residuals of the OLS 
regression are plotted against the dependent variable, and the shape of 
the residual distribution pattern would suggest whether the variance of 
the error term is constant. Park (1966), Glajser (1969), Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1972), and Breusch and Pagan (1979) discussed alternative 
methods of detecting heteroskedasticity. The common treatment of this 
problem is to use* the weighted regression method designed to reduce the 
nonhomogeneity of the variance. However, a prerequisite for using 
weighted least squares is that the nature of heteroskedasticity be 
known. For our sample, the presence of an unknown form of 
heteroskedasticity was detected in the data. The consequence of 
heteroskadasticity is to render least squares estimates inconsistent. 
It is important to properly adjust the least squares result for this 
fact. Instead of using the covariance matrix of the least squares 
estimator, the standard errors of the estimates were obtained by 
constructing the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. The square root 
of the diagonal elements of this matrix provide correct and consistent 
estimates of the,standard errors when heteroskedasticity of an unknown 
form is present in the data (White, 1980).
III. Discharge Reduction Function Estimates
a. Collective Discharges
Parish level discharge reduction function estimates for total, 
air, and land releases are reported in Table 5.1. The variable
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Table 5.1
Parish Level Discharge Reduction Function Estimates
TOTAL MODEL AIR MODEL LAND MODEL
INTERCEPT 165,721,273a 22,005,301b 216,530
(2.941) (1.706) (0.528)
RELEASE87 -0.72a 0. 19
c*01
(-7.304) (1.299) (-1637)
DENSITY 4,126.72 165.67 -243.80a
(0.321) (0.245) (-2.926)
BLACK -1,119,254a -112,568° -1,753
(-2.990) (-1.492) (-0.647)
INCOME -3,544.23a -363.50b -60.12a
(-2.329) (-1.817) (-2.548)
HOME 664.39 19.92 17.92a
(1.024) (0.392) (2.325)
COLLEGE -2,453,257a -116,350 -18,537b
(-2.496) (-1.123) (-1.869)
REGVOTE -898,144a -142,319b 8,023a
(-2.419) (-1.679) (2.308)
FIRMS 3,389,126a 46,624 36,989a
(2.981) (0.309) (2.979)
N 49 49 27
F-value 28.719 2.527 124,476
R2 0.8221 0.2029 0.999
t-statistic in parentheses, 
a Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
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RELEASE in Table 5.1 is defined as 1987 total, air, and land87
releases, respectively, in the three models.
The Total Model regression results reveal that the proposed model
explains roughly 82 percent of the variance in observed reductions in
total discharges. The negative and statistically significant
coefficient estimate of RELEASE indicates that the greater the level87 &
of discharges in 1987, the greater the reductions in those releases in 
1989; that is, the difference between 1989 and 1987 releases is 
algebraically greater. This relation is expected since it may be easier 
for firms to reduce discharges when their initial volumes are high if 
there are increasing marginal control costs. We suspect that RELEASE^ 
is acting as a proxy for control cost.
The negative and highly significant coefficient estimate for BLACK 
represents an important result for this study. It indicates that the 
greater the percentage of blacks in a parish, the greater the 
reductions in toxic discharges. This relation may be explained by the 
increased attention that has arisen in recent years about blacks and 
other racial minorities being disproportionately exposed to potential 
environmental risk. Historically, environmental advocacy in black
communities has been somehow dormant; tolerance, perhaps due to limited 
economic means, fear of job loss, and poor access to power, has been 
the norm in black communities. The emergence of environmental activism 
in these communities is a recent phenomenon. Greater empowerment and
greater political awakening of blacks can help explain why firms may 
have responded by lowering discharges. In fact, a similar relationship 
is observed in a recent study by Gelobter (1992). Gelobter’s findings 
indicated that non-whites experience slightly greater reductions in
105
exposure to pollutants than whites. The implications of his findings, 
however, are not clear since they may have resulted from the fact that 
marginal cost of pollution control is lower in the areas that are 
heavily polluted. The advantage of the present study is that it 
controls for this cost effect by including the RELEASE^ variable.
Parish median income (INCOME) has the expected sign and is highly 
significant. The higher the income levels in a given parish, the 
greater the reduction in total toxic discharges. The percentage of 
population who are college graduates (COLLEGE) and the ratio of 
registered to eligible voters (REGVOTE) in a parish both have the 
expected relationships. The more educated and the more politically 
active the community, the greater the discharge reductions over time. 
Median home value (HOME) is not statistically significant. This result 
may be attributable to the high degree of collinearity between median 
family income and median home value. The pairwise correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is 0.827. When the HOME variable 
is taken out of the regression equation, all other variables retain 
their sign and significance. When INCOME is taken out, the coefficient 
estimate of HOME changes to the anticipated sign and becomes 
significant.
Table 5.1 shows that the more firms there are in a parish, the 
smaller the reduction in toxic discharges over time. Theoretically, it 
is expected that community opposition will be greater when many 
polluters are located in a given area. Increased community opposition 
will, in turn, trigger the firms to respond by lowering discharges in 
order to avoid additional regulatory costs. However, with many 
polluting firms the probability of proving a particular firm is at
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fault may be reduced, making it easier for a polluter to hide. This 
potential pollution "hiding effect" on control behavior may explain the 
positive coefficient estimate for FIRMS.
A frequently raised question in the literature on environmental 
equity is whether it is race or income which explains environmental 
data. In response to this concern, we use the method of beta
coefficients, or standardized regressions, to make direct comparisons 
between variables. The beta coefficient is directly related to the OLS 
coefficient; it is calculated by multiplying the OLS coefficient
estimate by the standard error of its regressor and dividing by the 
standard error of the regressand. The beta coefficient can be 
interpreted as measuring the degree of change in the standard error of 
the dependent variable resulting from one standard error change in the 
independent variable (Kennedy, 1986, p.213). The results of this
standardization reveal that income is more important than race in 
explaining the observed reductions in total toxic discharges. While a 
change of 1 standard deviation in INCOME results in a 0.39 standard 
deviation change in total discharge reduction, the same change in BLACK 
results in a 0.29 standard deviation change in ARELEASE. The results 
also reveal that the most important regressor in the Total Model is 
RELEASE , followed by FIRMS, INCOME, BLACK, COLLEGE and REGVOTE,87
respectively.
The coefficient estimates for the air discharge reduction function 
in Table 5.1 Air Model are qualitatively similar to the Total Model 
estimates, with the exception of RELEASE . Nevertheless, the positive 
coefficient estimate for RELEASE^ is statistically insignificant. 
BLACK, INCOME, and REGVOTE are the only variables with statistically
107
significant coefficient estimates. The standardized regression model
indicates that income is also more important than race in explaining
the obseved reductions in air discharges. Overall, the Air Model has
less explanatory power than the Total Model as indicated by lower F and 
— 2R values.
The land discharge reduction model (Land Model), on the other
hand, has a greater explanatory power then either the Total or Air
' — 2Models; it has an almost perfect R value. Inspection of the data
revealed that the strong fit may be explained by the high degree of
correlation between the dependent variable ARELEASE and RELEASE .87
Reported land releases in 1989 were dramatically smaller than the 
reported releases in 1987, so the difference in discharges was 
basically similar to the values of 1987 releases with a negative sign 
attached to them. Nevertheless, some interesting relationships are 
observed and are worth noting.
Population density (DENSITY) is an important determinant of land 
discharge reductions. The reductions are greater the higher the 
population density. This is consistent with both regulatory risk based 
enforcement and potential costs to firms of polluting behavior. This 
variable is only significant in the Land Model. The coefficient 
estimate for BLACK is negative but insignificant. Median home value 
(HOME), on the other hand, has a positive and highly significant 
coefficient estimate indicating that the higher the home values, the 
lower the observed reductions in land discharges. This is inconsistent 
with theory and common sense. A similar inconsistent result is observed 
with REGVOTE. A positive and significant coefficient estimate for 
REGVOTE raises further concerns about the credibility of this model.
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These unusual results may be attributed to the fact that land 
discharges are highly localized and, therefore, cannot be effectively 
estimated using the characteristics of the parish population. If this 
is true, we expect the land discharge reduction function to yield more 
meaningful results when the function is estimated at a lower
aggregation level.
The Zip Code level discharge reduction function estimates are 
reported in Table 5.2. The Total Model coefficient estimates are 
qualitatively similar to the parish level estimates although not as 
statistically significant. While the coefficient estimate of INCOME 
retains its negative sign, it is only significant at the 20% level. 
Furthermore, the'parameter estimate of BLACK is insignificant even at 
the 20% level. The results of the Air Model indicate that income is a 
more significant determinant of air discharge reduction than race, 
education and home values. Furthermore, among the significant
coefficients, namely, RELEASE , INCOME and FIRMS, INCOME ranks the
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most important factor in explaining reductions in air discharges, 
followed by RELEASE^ and FIRMS, respectively.
The Land Model shows race to be a significant factor in
determining land discharge reductions. However, the Land Model estimate 
of BLACK is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
the higher the percentage blacks in a zip code area, the lower the 
reductions in land discharges, which is contrary to prior results. The 
population variable, POP, is significantly negative, and could be 
acting as a proxy for DENSITY, yielding results consistent with the 
Land Model in Table 5.1. The estimated coefficient for RELEASE is87
negative one, suggesting that all releases to land were terminated by
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Table 5.2
Zip Code Level Discharge Reduction Function Estimates
TOTAL MODEL AIR MODEL LAND MODEL
INTERCEPT 6,023,864 439,271a -233,024°
(0.974) (2.179) (-1.471)
RELEASE87 -0.63a -0.06a -i.ooa
(-2.847) (-2.368) (-1057)
POP 249.87 -1.48 -4.57b
(1.358) (-0.318) (-1.937)
BLACK -43,020 -2,582 3,605b
(-0.803) (-0.779) (1.693)
INCOME -459.18 -45.36a 16.58
(-1.294) (-2.455) (1.148)
HOME 84.76 11.06 -5.57
(0.827) (1.053) (-1.049)
COLLEGE ■ -148,508 4,681 -23.41
(-1.196) (0.348) (-0.008)
FIRMS 817,938 79,954a 11,542
(1.320) (2.209) (0.883)
N 112 105 43
F-value 33.995 2. 144 55,084
R2 0.6754 0.0715 0.999
t-statistic in parentheses.
a Significance at 5% level.
b Significance at 10% level.
c Significance at 15% level.
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1989. If this were true, or roughly true, other variables are not 
likely to explain much of the release reductions.
A comparison of results in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 reveal that 
community characteristics are not as significant determinants of zip 
code level reductions as they are of parish level reductions. These 
results seem to suggest that strong aggregated community effects and 
weak local community effects in determining the behavior of firms,
b. Individual Discharges
The individual discharge reduction function estimates using one, 
two, three, four and five mile radius circles for Total, Air and Land 
Models are reported in Tables 5.3 through 5.5, respectively. In 
estimating individual discharge reduction functions, only those 
facilities located in populated areas are considered. The sample size,
N, depends on the radius of the circle drawn around the facilities. For 
instance, when a circle of one mile radius is drawn around each 
facility that reported toxic releases in both 1987 and 1989, the sample 
includes only 92 facilities in estimating the Total Model, 88 
facilities in the Air Model, and 23 in the Land Model; with a radius of 
two miles, the sample size grows to 136, 130, and 40 facilities in
Total, Air, and Land Models, respectively; etc.
Inspection of the results in Tables 5.3-5.5 reveals again the 
importance of RELEASE^ in explaining the observed reductions in total, 
air, and land discharges. The coefficient estimates of RELEASE are87
consistently negative and significant for all specifications. This 
relationship indicates that what is true for the collective discharge 
reductions is also true for individual discharges. Individual 
facilities that reported high discharges in 1987 are the ones that
I l l
Table 5.3





WITH RADII OF 
THREE MILES FOUR MILES FIVE MILES
INTERCEPT 465,787 10,314,342 6,923,585 -7,124,902 -17,225,496
(0.056) (1.096) (1.144) (-0.858) (-1.271)
RELEASE87 -0.52b -0.63a -0.63a -0.64a -0.63a
(-1.789) (-2.824) (-2.788) (-2.842) (-2.842)
DENSITY 534.28 115.20 90.03 -132.37 -280.64
(1. 1,85) (0.284) (0.253) (-0.396) (-0.695)
BLACK 40,494° 26,353° -17,829 -48,244 -44,772
(1.517) (1.420) (-0.730) (-1.226) (-1.019)
FEMALE 27,233 -127,635 -115,652 128,001 251,411
(0.249) (-0.715) (-0.987) (0.937) (1.302)
OLD -279,980 -278,467a -18,554 112,097 252,437
(-0.988) (-2.018) (-0.339) (0.979) (1.046)
HOME 3.89 -9.98 -8.06 -6. 11 30.79
(0.133) (-0.647) (-0.444) (-0.230) (0.775)
FIRMS -949,757 -142,706 236,599 382,117b 315,796b
(-1.126) (-0.704) (1.410) (1.723) (1.657)
N 92 136 150 153 156
F-value 17.360 41.944 45.892 47.599 48.839
R2 0.5572 0.6798 0.6784 0.6821 0.6836
t-statistic in parentheses, 
a Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
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Table 5.4





WITH RADII OF 
THREE MILES FOUR MILES FIVE MILES
INTERCEPT 346,404° 378,250 711,111 568,846 175,098
(1.438) (0.579) (1.075) (0.941) (0.Ill)
RELEASE87 -0.60a -0.29a -0.29a -0.29a -0.29a
(-4.588) (-23.019) (-22.845) (-23.801) (-23.396)
DENSITY 4. 16 -23.10 -23.41 -27.39 -9.96
(0.268) (-1.403) (-1.319) (-1.376) (-0.271)
BLACK 794.79 -1,950.14 -1,426.30 1,432.76 128.45
(0.776) (-1.261) (-0.718) (0.882) (0.061)
FEMALE -8,522.31° -1,769.51 -8,780.16 -9,181.14 2,136.50
(-1.507) (-0.148) (-0.746) (-0.887) (0.067)
OLD 2,859.52 -5,827.10 -4,946.01 -5,240.03 -7,026.16
(0.415) (-0.686) (-0.628) (-0.380) (-0.421)
HOME 2. 18 -2.71 -2.94 -1.02 -4.43
(1.065) (-1.318) (-0.847) (-0.485) (-1.039)
FIRMS -3,385 11,574 10,177 2,402 5,211
(-0.171) (0.624) (0.971) (0.306) (0.684)
N 88 130 141 144 147
F-value 38.506 91.528 98.331 99.906 109.190
R2 0.7511 0.8309 0.8295 0.8288 0.8291
t-statistic in parentheses, 
a Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
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Table 5.5





WITH RADII OF 
THREE MILES FOUR MILES FIVE MILES
INTERCEPT 2,559,341a -394,082 38,606 122,257 1,102,065°
(2.279) (-0.957) (0.184) (0.348) (1.535)
RELEASE87 -1.08a -0.99a -i.ooa
o0T—11 -i.ooa
(-18.29) (-4499) (-2924) (-2598) (-3152)
DENSITY 23.97 -53.55° -34.54 -32.01 -2.81
(1.069) (-1.543) (-1.171) (-1.003) (-0.092)
BLACK -1,617° 923.10 441.25 2,693.34 4,355.76
(-1.577) (0.492) (0.274) (0.987) (1.173)
FEMALE -40,657a 9,074 2,115 -2,644.80 -23,312.62
(-2.253) (1.269) (0.740) (-0.442) (-1.473)
OLD -14,471b 3,832.55 -2,436.95 -3,614.07 -5,487.48
(-1.940) (0.657) (-0.813) (-0.718) (-0.803)
HOME -2.74° -1. 13 -1.60 1. 19 2.99
(-1.498) (-0.845) (-0.993) (0.668) (0.710)
FIRMS -68,489b -5,780 6,810 -3,205 -11,716
(-1.918) (-0.416) (0.786) (-0.313) (-0.950)
N 23 40 45 45 46
F-value 16.805 48,420 54,647 56,836 62,303
R2 0.834 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
t-statistic in parentheses, 
a Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
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reduced reductions by a greater magnitude, possibly because of lower 
marginal control 'costs or higher expected enforcement related costs.
With the exception of RELEASE , the estimated coefficients differ87
in sign and significance across alternative ring aggregation levels.
One and Two mile radius estimates are of particular importance because 
they isolate the characteristics of communities closest to the toxic 
sources. In the Total Model (Table 5.3), the coefficient estimates for 
BLACK are positive and weakly significant at the 15% level for One and 
Two mile rings, indicating that the greater the percentage of blacks 
living in close proximity to toxic releasing facilities, the lower the 
level of observed reductions. This result lends support to the 
hypothesis that blacks are disproportionately more exposed to potential 
environmental risks over time. However, this relationship is no longer 
valid as the level of community aggregation increases. The coefficient 
estimates are negative but insignificant v/ith rings of Three to Five 
miles.
The percentage of persons aged 62 and above, OLD, in the immediate 
community seems to be an important determinant of the observed 
reductions in total discharges. The negative and highly significant 
coefficient estimate of OLD in the Two mile radius regression indicates 
that the greater the percentage of elderly in the community the greater 
the reductions in total discharges. As the community aggregation level 
increases, this variable becomes insignificant. The coefficient 
estimates for FIPJMS become positive and significant as the size of the 
circle increases. This provides continued support for the "hiding" 
hypothesis: individual firm’s discharges are reduced by a smaller
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magnitude when the number of other firms in its proximity increases.
This is consistent with the results reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
The estimated coefficients for the air discharge reduction 
function show slightly different relations. In general, the Air Model 
shows little significance of the socioeconomic variables. DENSITY in 
the Air Model (Table 5.4) has negative coefficient estimates, albeit 
significant only at the 20% level. There is some evidence that the more 
densely populated the area the greater the efforts by the firm to 
reduce air discharges. This relationship was not observed in the Total 
Model estimation. The coefficient estimates of BLACK alternate in sign 
as the size of the circle increases but are insignificant. The 
percentage of females (FEMALE) in the immediate vicinity of the firm is 
an important determinant of air discharge reductions. The higher the 
percentage of females the greater the reduction in air discharges. It 
has been documented that women have "established social networks 
available for quick action, and they are more likely to recognize 
patterns of ill health in the neighborhood" (Edelstein, 1988, p. 141). 
Hamilton (1985) reported that concern about toxic wastes and 
contamination problems is highest among women and among those who have 
children under the age of 18. Furthermore, he suggested that 
"opposition to toxic wastes could eventually become a "motherhood 
issue", impossible for a politician not to support." (p. 479).
The land discharge reduction function is shown in Table 5.5. 
Coefficient estimates at the One mile radius are of special interest.
Land releases are highly localized and impact the immediate 
communities. Table 5.5 results are very interesting. Note that in 
explaining the observed reductions in land discharges, the One Mile
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population characteristics have many significant coefficient estimates.
The results are generally consistent with prior expectations. Unlike 
the Total Model, BLACK in the Land Model has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate. FEMALE and OLD are also 
strong determinants of the land discharge reduction functions; the 
higher the percentages of females and elderly in the community the 
greater the reductions in land discharges. Home values in the immediate 
vicinity have the expected negative sign. Only in the land discharge 
reduction function and only at the lowest level of community 
aggregation is , the coefficient estimate of HOME negative and
significant at the 15% level. It may be that local communities are more
sensitive to land discharges than total toxic discharges. The FIRMS 
variable is significantly negative, differing from prior results. This 
makes some sense, as hiding may not be a feasible strategy at such a
localized level. The FIRMS variable may represent a localized "hot
spot" effect, causing greater enforcement intensity.
The standardized coefficient estimates for the Land Model at the
One Mile level reveal that RELEASE is the most important factor and
87
BLACK is the least important factor in explaining the observed
reductions in land discharges. If HOME is acting as a proxy for income, 
then income is more important than race in the Land Model also.
The above results indicate that there is a definite trend in the 
sign and significance of the coefficient estimates as the community 
aggregation level increases. There are more significant socioeconomic 
effects for proximate communities than for larger aggregated 
communities. The One or Two mile ring effects, which represent the
lowest level of community aggregation, may be different from the more
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aggregated rings, perhaps indicating the differences in community 
responses as the distance from the pollution source increases.
Spatially aggregating community characteristics may not be valid 
if it is expected that distant communities will behave differently or 
have different effects from the proximate communities. In response to 
this concern, communities were classified into two groups, or rings, 
based on their distance from the pollution source. Those living within 
a two mile distance from the source are considered the immediate, or 
Ring 1, communities; and those living within at least two and at most 
five miles from the source are considered the distant, or Ring 2, 
communities. Table 5.6 presents the independent ring approach to 
estimating total, air, and land discharge reduction functions.
The results of the independent ring analysis are disappointing.
2First, the adjusted R ’s are not higher than those for the Five mile 
radius regressions in Table 5.3-5.5, which suggests that segmenting the 
circles into two separate parts does not enhance explanatory power. 
Second, most coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant, 
which may be due to the high correlations between Ring 1 and Ring 2 
characteristics. For instance, the pairwise correlation coefficient 
between DENSITY1 and DENSITY2 is in excess of 0.8; the correlation 
between FIRM1 and FIRM2 is above 0.6, and that between BLACK1 and 
BLACK2 is above 0.5.
Only the Total Model in Table 5.6 shows meaningful statistically 
significant coefficient estimates, namely the female, age, and firm 
variables. The FEMALE1 coefficient estimate, which is significant at 
the 10% level, is inconsistent with the FEMALE coefficient pattern in 
Table 5.3. The 0LD1 and 0LD2 coefficients are consistent with the OLD
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Table 5.6
Ring Level Discharge Reduction Function Estimates
TOTAL MODEL AIR MODEL LAND MODEL
INTERCEPT -2,399,073 -4,999 38,554
(-0.845) (-0.036) (0.779)
RELEASE -0.64a -0.29a -1.00a87
(-3.105) (-21.903) (-1916)
DENSITY1 -2,715.24 -71.99 -33.50
(-1.132) (-1.008) (-0.917)
DENSITY2 2,184.22 86.55 -12.38
(0.920) (0.931) (-0.380)
BLACK1 49,657 -3,997a -1,123
(1.199) (-1.922) (-0.988)
BLACK2 -55,518 2,180 3,650
(-0.923) (1.064) (1.273)
FEMALE1 109,651b 3,825 5,862
(1. 62.0) (0.994) (1.303)
FEMALE2 -193,303 7,246 -6,158
(-1.214) (1.099) (-0.777)
0LD1 -475,618b 3,822 5,310
(-1.835) (0.415) (-0.727)
0LD2 690,200° -16,043 -761
(1.523) (-0.876) (-0.071)
H0ME1 -33.72 -1.99 -2.23
i (-0.777) (-0.855) (-1.375)
H0ME2 120.00 -5.96 4.29
(1.361) (-1.271) (0.925)
FIRM1 -1,086,598 -3,896 -5,765
(-1.410) (-0.112) (-0.454)
FIRM2 725,745b 11,788 -8,717
(1.639) (0.586) (-0.581)
N 157 148 47
F-value 28.484 55.565 30,889






at 5% level, 
at 10% level, 
at 15% level.
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coefficient patterns in Table 5.3. Finally, the FIRM2 coefficient 
suggests that the larger the total number of firms located far from the 
firm under observation, the lower the firm’s discharge reduction. This 
may result from a transfer of regulatory enforcement effort, or 
concern, away from the firm under observation to distant "hot spots" 
with a large number of firms. The Air Model shows a significantly 
negative BLACK1 effect, as generally expected, and is consistent with 
Table 5.4 patterns. The Land Model in Table 5.6 has no meaningfully 
significant socioeconomic variables, contrary to results in Table 5.5. 
Again, the coefficient for RELEASE^ is negative one, suggesting 
complete elimination of land releases,
c. Collective versus Individual Discharges
To directly compare aggregated versus disaggregated reductions in 
releases across parish, zip code and block groups, we ran regressions 
including only those variables that are common to all the data sets for 
all the community aggregation levels. The results for the Total Model 
are presented in Table 5.7. A careful examination of the results 
reveals that the coefficient estimates retain at least their signs, if 
not their significance levels, when we exclude the non-common 
variables. The only exception is the sign and significance of the HOME 
coefficient estimate at the parish level. When INCOME is excluded from 
the parish regression, median home value may act as a proxy for income.
Note that median income and median home value are highly positively 
correlated with a pairwise correlation coefficient in excess of 0.8. A 
negative sign for the coefficient estimate of HOME indicates that the 
higher the home value in a given locality, the greater the reductions
Table 5.7
Total Discharge Reduction Function Estimates




Four Miles Five Miles Zip Code Parish
INTERCEPT -1,880,784 -40,156 737,503 1,020,631 -371,392 180,984 23,113,386'
(0.804) (-0.037) (0.765) (0.911) (-0.302) (0.080) (1.619)
RELEASE -0.51b -0.63a -0.63a -0.64a -0.64a -0.63a -0.12'87
(-1.778) (-2.793) (-2.791) (-2.844) (-2.833) (-2.869) (-5.307)
POP 416.73 41.22 3.43 -2.39 -2.66 259.84 58.38
(1.385) (0.669) (0.162) (-0.277) (-0.353) (1.352) (0.685)
BLACK 36,939° 15,431 -21,662 -42,471 -35,030 -11,670 -581,213*
(1.528) (1.056) (-0.867) (-1.101) (-0.892) (-0.327) (-1.907)
HOME -6.59 -8.72 -6.42 -9.96 19.76 -113.62 -550.90*
(-0.220) (-0.416) (-0.329) (-0.412) (0.643) (-1.175) (-1.603)
FIRMS -1,084,409 -99,072 233,352 374,086b 261,361b 717,937 1,898,027
(-1.193) (-0.420) (1.384) (1.752) (1.770) (1.133) (1.419)
N 92 136 150 153 157 112 49
F-value 24.714 58.798 65.090 67.416 68.605 47.529 35.027
R2 0.5658 0.6816 0.6826 0.6860 0.6856 0.6770 0.7800
t-values in parantheses. 
a Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
in toxic releases. Note that this variable is significant only at the 
parish level.
The results in Table 5.7 reveal an interesting converging pattern 
in the signs of the coefficient estimates for BLACK and FIRMS as the 
level of community aggregation increases. For instance, while BLACK has 
a positive and weakly significant coefficient estimates at low levels 
of community aggregation (one and two mile radius), the sign changes 
with three mile radius and stays consistently negative as the community 
aggregation increases. At the parish level, the coefficient estimate is 
negative and significant at the 10% level. FIRMS, on the other hand, 
has negative, but insignificant, coefficient estimates at low levels of 
aggregation and these change to significantly positive coefficient 
estimates at higher levels of community aggregation.
Table 5.8 presents the air discharge reduction function estimates 
for alternative levels of community aggregation. While the coefficient 
estimate of POP at the parish level is positive and significant at the 
10% level indicating that the more populated the parish the smaller the 
reductions, the coefficient estimates of POP in Two, Three and Four 
Mile rings are negative, indicating that reductions are greater in more 
populated areas. These differences may be attributed to the fact that 
at the parish level, population may proxy economic activity and growth, 
suggesting smaller reductions in discharges with more economic 
activity. However, in spatially constrained radius regressions POP 
proxies density and we get results consistent with DENSITY patterns in 
Table 5.4: i.e., higher density implies greater reductions. BLACK
maintains a negative and weakly significant coefficient in the Air 
Model. FIRMS maintains a significantly positive coefficient only at the
Table 5.8
Air Discharge Reduction Function Estimates




Four Miles Five Miles Zip Code Parish
INTERCEPT -26,668 201,507 191,429 20,418 162,442 -127,934 3,134,370
(-0.278) (1.189) (0.856) (0.159) (0.838) (-0.688) (1.112)
RELEASE87 -0.60a -0.29a -0.29a -0.29a -0.29a -0.06a 0.19
(-4.526) (-22.59) (-22.61) (-23.52) (-22.78) (-2.131) (0.997)
POP 0.44 -2.39° -1.22° -0.88b -0.23 0.06 8.80b
(0.061) (-1.543) (-1.506) (-1.918) (-0.541) (0.011) (1.814)
BLACK 517.21 -2,079c -1,892 967.08 158.49 984.99 -47,028
(0.579) (-1.439) (-0.991) (0.619) (0.082) (0.291) (-0.859)
HOME 1.97 -2.51 -2.64 -0.59 -3.88 -3.81 -74.81
(1.016) (-1.176) (-0.748) (-0.300) (-1.147) (-1.159) (-1.240)
FIRMS -4,596.34 14,009 11,830 4,052.70 6,471.25 61,545b -104,426
(-0.238) (0.836) (1.244) (0.595) (1.015) (1.737) (-0.733)
N 88 130 141 144 147 105 49
F-value 54.499 129.697 139.154 141.538 144.779 2.095 1.723
R2 0.7546 0.8330 0.8315 0.8309 0.8312 0.0500 0.0701
t-values in parantheses. 
a Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
123
zip code level of aggregation. The Air Model regression results at the
parish and zip code level reveal that the model does not have good
— 2explanatory power; the coefficients of determination, R , are 0.05 and 
0.07, respectively, and the F tests do not reject the hypothesis that 
the partial slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero.
The land discharge reduction function estimates are presented in 
Table 5.9. The coefficient estimates in the parish and zip code 
regressions are qualitatively similar to Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 
results, respectively. We had emphasized the importance of one mile 
radius level analysis in estimating land discharge reduction functions 
because of the highly localized characteristic of the externality. 
However, a comparison of Tables 5.9 and 5.5 provides a substantially 
different interpretation of socioeconomic effects. In Table 5.9, none 
of the variables are significant, while Table 5.5 shows considerable 
significance and anticipated signs for the very localized One mile ring 
regressions.
IV. Conclusions
This chapter is a preliminary attempt to explain the pollution 
control behavior of a toxic releasing firms as a function of community 
socioeconomic characteristics. Maintaining the hypothesis that a 
community’s characteristics and political activism impact the behavior 
of a risk neutral profit maximizing firm, we estimated collective and 
individual discharge reduction functions for three types of discharges, 
total, air and land, using alternative community aggregation levels. 
Collective discharge reduction functions pertained to the behavior of 
all toxic releasing firms in a given geographical area. In estimating 
collective discharge reduction functions, we aggregated the total, air,
Table 5.9
Land Discharge Reduction Function Estimates




Four Miles Five Miles Zip Code Parish
INTERCEPT 254,041 111,409 98,051 -74,536 -167,446 30,956 -13,514
(1.138) (1.229) (1.066) (-0.661) (-0.742) (0.267) (-0.128)
RELEASE^ -1.03a -Q.99a -1.ooa
0o01 -1.0Qa -0.99s -0.99s
(-30.96) (-5911) (-3217) (-2503) (-2942) (-4318) (-2143)
POP -5.33 -3.70 -1.49 -0.77 -0.59 -3.80b -0.83b
(-0.842) (-1.263) (-1.172) (-1.279) (-1.252) (-1.891) (-1.761)
BLACK -1,357.19 1,311.74 520.39 2,614.15 3,271.52 2,167,80s 1,551.04
(-1.094) - (0.676) (0.318) (0.998) (1.009) (2.030) (1.019)
HOME -2.77 -1.29 -1.36 1.53 3.52 -0.70 -1.43
(-1.080) (-0.979) (-0.935) (0.850) (0.861) (-0.386) (-0.514)
FIRMS -40,666 -5,706 7,707 -3,094 -5,754 12,251 21,531b
(-1.107) (-0.397) (0.848) (-0.308) (-0.551) (0.906) (1.981)
N 23 40 45 45 46 43 27
F-value 11.749 71,258 80,298 83,320 88,979 76,659 157,326
R2 0.7095 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9999
t-values in parantheses.
« Significance at 5% level, 
b Significance at 10% level, 
c Significance at 15% level.
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and land discharges of all toxic releasing firms located in a given 
parish or zip code area and used the characteristics of these 
aggregated communities to explain the reductions in discharges. The 
individual discharge reduction function examined the behavior of single 
toxic releasing firms as a function of distance specific community 
characteristics.
The results of our analysis indicate that community socioeconomic 
characteristics are relatively important factors in explaining the 
observed reductions in toxic discharges. While the significance of the 
coefficient estimates vary across alternative community aggregation 
levels, a general pattern is observed. The parish level analysis, Table 
5.1, revealed that the higher the income levels in a parish the greater 
the reductions in total, air, and land discharges over time. Also, the 
more educated and the more politically active the community is the 
greater the reductions in discharges. One of the more interesting 
results, at the parish level, was the significance of the race variable 
in explaining the Total and the Air Models. The results indicated that 
the greater the percentage of blacks in the community the greater the 
reductions in total and air toxic discharges. This relationship may 
provide support to the observation that blacks are becoming more active 
in environmental issues. However, in terms of relative importance in 
explaining the collective discharge reductions, income was a more 
important factor than race. Another interesting relationship in the 
parish level regression relates to the number of firms variable. The 
results indicated that when the number of toxic releasing firms 
increases, the reductions in discharges are smaller. This seems to be a 
reasonable relationship since the variable measures the level of
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industrial activity in the area. The greater the industrial activity, 
the greater the production of discharges in an area. With many firms 
concentrated in an area, pinpointing particular firm discharges over 
time is difficult task to the regulator. Hence, firms located in 
industrial complexes have both the incentive and the ability to "hide" 
from regulators.
The zip code level analysis, Table 5.2, produced estimates 
qualitatively similar to parish results, albeit not as significant 
statistically. It was surprising to note that at this lower level of 
community aggregation, the estimated models were not superior to the 
parish models. The only significantly different relationship between 
the two was observed in the land discharge reduction model. In the Land 
Model, the coefficient estimate of BLACK was positive indicating that 
the greater the percentage of blacks in the area, the lower the 
reductions in land discharges.
Individual discharge reduction function estimates, Tables 5.3-5.5, 
reveal that the coefficients are very sensitive to the specification of 
the model. When we consider the characteristics of the communities 
living within a distance of one mile from a toxic releasing facility, 
the coefficient estimates are dramatically different from estimates 
based on the characteristics of communities living within three miles 
of the facilities. In estimating the total discharge reduction model, 
Table 5.3, the coefficient estimate for the percentage of blacks was 
positive indicating that the greater the percentage of blacks in the 
immediate vicinity of the firm the lower the reductions in the firm’s 
total discharges. This relationship lends support to the hypothesis 
that blacks are disproportionately more exposed to environmental risk.
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However, this relationship was not observed with more aggregated 
community characteristics. The percentage of elderly people in the 
community was also a significant factor in explaining the observed 
reductions in individual discharges. The estimates of the number of 
firms variable in the Total Model provided continued support for the 
hiding hypothesis. The Air Model, Table 5.4, revealed the significance 
of the female variable in explaining the reductions in air discharges.
The Land Model, Table 5.5, produced a very interesting set of 
estimates when the One Mile radius population variables were used as 
regressors. The results indicated that the greater the percentages of 
blacks, females and elderly in the community and the higher the median 
home value, the greater the observed reductions in land discharges. 
Furthermore, the estimate for the number of firms variable in the One 
Mile analysis was significantly negative indicating that the greater 
the number of toxic releasing facilities in the immediate proximity of 
the firm under observation the greater the reductions in the firm’s 
land discharges. Obviously, the firm’s behavior reflects the highly 
localized nature of the externality it created. Hence, the implication 
is that the firm is in a "hot spot" and hiding is not a feasible 
strategy with a spatially concentrated externality.
In general, the estimation results revealed that the models are 
very sensitive to the level of aggregation. While parish level analysis 
provided very interesting results, the zip code level analysis was 
basically uninformative. Furthermore, the individual regressions showed 
how the signs and significance of the coefficient estimates differed 
across alternative community aggregation levels and alternative types 
of discharge measures. Tables 5.7 through 5.9 provided ample evidence
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This dissertation tested whether the location and environmental 
control behavior of toxic chemical releasing facilities (TRI 
facilities) in Louisiana were systematically related to the 
socioeconomic and racial characteristics of the surrounding 
communities. Following the "site distribution" models in the 
literature, the location of toxic releasing facilities was used as an 
indicator of environmental quality. The distribution pattern of toxic 
releasing facilities in Louisiana suggested that some communities may 
be disproportionately exposed to potential toxic risks.
Most toxic sources were located in the southern portion of the 
state along the lower Mississippi River. Using alternative community 
aggregation levels, Chapter 3 identified who lives near the toxic 
sources in Louisiana, and determined whether, and how, the 
characteristics of these communities differ from those of Louisiana’s 
general population. The results of the parish level analysis, the 
highest level of community aggregation, indicated that there were 
significant differences between the characteristics of the parish 
population in which toxic sources were located and the state’s general
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population characteristics. Income, income related variables, such as 
education, and property values were significantly lower in TRI hosting 
parishes than the state averages. There were no statistical differences 
in the racial composition of the population at this aggregation level.
The zip code level analysis, a lower level of community 
aggregation, revealed similar divergences from the state averages as 
the parish data for income variables, but of a smaller magnitude. 
Compared to the state, zip code area communities had lower per capita 
income, fewer families with incomes above $75,000, fewer college 
graduates, and lower home and rent values. A major difference from the 
parish level analysis was the statistical differences in the racial 
composition of the population. The mean percentage of blacks in TRI 
facility hosting zip code area populations was above the state’s 
average. One of the more significant findings of Chapter 3 was that 
income variables showed less divergence and race variables more 
divergence with lower degrees of community aggregation. For example, in 
1990 mean per capita incomes in the state, TRI hosting parishes, and 
TRI hosting zip code areas were $9,949, $8,979 (± $199), and $9,399 (± 
$164), respectively. The difference between host parish and state per 
capita incomes was significantly greater than that between host zip 
code and state. The mean percentage of blacks in the state, host 
parish, and host zip code areas, on the other hand, were 27.7%, 28.61%
(± 1.81), and 30.34% (± 1.69), respectively. While the difference
between host parish and state racial composition was statistically 
insignificant, that between host zip code and state was significant at 
the 15 percent significance level.
The significance of divergent racial distributions at lower 
aggregation levels was more evident when distance specific data were 
used in the analysis. A major contribution of this dissertation was the 
explicit recognition of the role distance from a toxic source may play 
in determining the burden of potential environmental risks. One of the 
significant contributions of the current study was the development of a 
data base that identifies communities based on their distances from 
toxic sources. This data base was used to detemine whether 
socioeconomic and racial characteristics of communities change as 
distance from the toxic sources increases. A distance gradient analysis 
in Chapter 3 indicated that as distance from the nearest toxic source 
increases, the percentage of blacks in the community decreases and the 
percentage of whites increases. The percentages of blacks were 
significantly higher than the state average in communities that live 
within a distance of one to three miles from toxic sources. While the 
mean percentage of blacks in the study area (all block groups that are 
within 100 mile of TRI facilities) was 29.99% (± 0.43), the mean values 
in communities that live within one, two, and three miles of the 
nearest TRI facility were 40.29% (± 1.41), 37.56% (± 1.0), and 32.92% 
(± 1.05), respectively. These findings suggest that blacks, more than 
whites, may be disproportionately exposed to potential toxic risks.
The sex and age composition of the communities also change as 
distance from toxic sources increases. Compared to the 100 mile study 
area, relatively more females, more elderly people (ages 62 and above), 
and fewer younger people (ages below 15) live in the immediate 
proximity of toxic sources. The mean percentages of females, elderly 
people, and younger people in the study area were 51.94% (±.06), 15.47%
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(± .11), and 25.38% (±.09), respectively. The corresponding percentages 
in communities living within one mile of the nearest TRI facility were 
52.71% (± .17), 16.76% (±.33), and 24.71% (± .28), respectively. The
mean percentage of females shows a modest but steady decline with 
distance from a source. The mean percentage of older people shows a 
decreasing trend over a limited distance range; and the mean percentage 
of younger people shows an increasing trend with distance.
The results also indicated that property values (measured by the 
means of median house and median rent values) are relatively higher in 
the immediate proximity of toxic sources, with the values declining as 
distance from the source increases. While the mean of the median home 
values in the study area was $55,636 (± $405), the highest mean home 
value of $62,840 (± $1,135) was observed in communities located within 
a distance of two miles from the nearest TRI facility. The lowest value 
of $40,979 (± $654) was observed in communities located within ten
miles from the nearest TRI facility. These findings are contrary to 
expectations. Property value studies predict that land prices will be 
lower in environmentally undesirable areas. Poor environmental quality 
is expected to drive away high-income households while attracting
lower-income groups, partly through the housing price mechanism.
Is the housing market in Louisiana failing to capture the negative 
externality created by these toxic sources? Not necessarily. TRI
facilities in Louisiana are mostly located in urban and densely 
populated areas. In fact, the mean population density systematically 
declines as the distance from toxic sources increases. The distance
from a TRI facility may be acting as a proxy for the distance from the 
central business district used in property value studies. The closer
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the property is located to the central business district, the higher^* 
its value.
Discrimination and prejudice in the housing markets may provide an 
alternative explanation for the observed relationships. The results 
indicate that more blacks pay higher prices to live near toxic sources.
This could only be true if housing markets are highly segregated. King 
and Mieszkowski (1973) analyzed the effects of racial variables on 
apartment rents in New Haven, Connecticut. Their study concluded that 
compared to a white in predominantly white neighborhood, a black in 
predominantly black neighborhood pays 9.3 percent more in rent for 
comparable housing. Yinger (1979) presents a comprehensive review of 
studies that have examined the relationship between racial composition 
and the price of housing.
Following the "community exposure" models in the literature, this 
study used the number of toxic releasing firms and the total and per 
capita toxic discharges as proxies for potential exposure. Correlation 
analysis was performed for these alternative exposure measures and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population surrounding the toxic 
sources. The results of the parish level analysis indicated that there 
were strong associations between income and other socioeconomic 
variables, and potential exposure measures, but not always in the same 
direction suggested by the literature. The results revealed that 
"exposure" to toxics is relatively higher in parishes with high income 
characteristics. The relationships between income variables and all 
three measures of potential exposure were consistently and 
significantly positive. Other socioeconomic variables, such as 
education and property values revealed similar associations. These
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positive relationships between income, and income related variables and 
potential exposure measures are contrary to findings reported in 
Freeman (1972), Asch and Seneca (1978), and Brajer and Hall (1992).
They are, however, consistent with findings reported in Napton and Day 
(1992). Evidently, the variables used as proxies for potential exposure 
also describe the level of industrial activity in a parish. The number 
of TRI facilities, and the amount of discharges are expected to be 
positively related to the levels of industrial production. Higher 
production levels may generate higher incomes, or may require higher 
compensation to attract workers.
The observed relationships were very sensitive to the degree of 
spatial aggregation. While TRI related industrial activities may be 
income enhancing at the parish level due to spillovers or need for 
compensating wage differentials, the results of the zip code level 
analysis revealed that such activities may also be related to depressed 
"localized" pockets. The results indicated that exposure to toxics was 
relatively lower in zip code areas characterized by high income 
characteristics. The percentage of families in the highest income class 
(incomes above $75,000) was negatively and significantly related to the 
level of per capita releases. There was also a significantly negative 
relationship between the rental value of housing and per capita 
releases at the zip code level.
The observed relationships between exposure measures and 
socioeconomic characteristics of populations reveal little about 
underlying causation. Residential and industrial location choices of 
households and firms are jointly related decisions, partially 
determining who bears the burden of environmental hazards. While market
factors, profits, tastes, etc. play a large role in the joint location 
decisions, other factors may also be important in explaining risk 
distributions and changes in these risks over time. The theoretical 
model presented in Chapter 4 suggested that environmental hazards in 
any community may be explained partially by the political activism of 
the local communites. The environmental control behavior of a risk 
neutral profit maximizing firm was modeled as being responsive to the 
political influence of local populations. The model presumed that 
releasing potentially harmful pollutants may trigger community 
opposition and, therefore, a discharger response to this opposition. 
Willingness and ability of households (factors reflected in income, 
race, education, and participation in political issues) to pursue 
remediation efforts to alleviate or compensate for the environmental 
disamenity created by the polluting firms are shown to have a direct 
effect on the pollution control behavior of firms. Firms have a profit 
motive to reduce pollution when community opposition is expected to 
increase regulatory and compliance cost. Individual firm’s behavior is 
also expected to be a function of the total number of other polluting 
firms in the area. An area heavily populated by polluting firms will be 
an obvious target for any regulatory initiative.
Chapter 5 provided direct tests of the hypothesis that 
environmental control behaviors of toxic releasing firms are related to 
the socioeconomic charactersitics of surrounding communities. A single 
equation model of toxic discharge reductions was posited as a function 
of several variables describing the people and the general area where 
firms are located. Using parish and zip code samples, this chapter 
estimated aggregated discharge reduction functions for total toxic
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releases, relases into the air, and releases onto the land by all firms 
within a defined geographic area. The estimation results revealed that 
some community socioeconomic characteristics were significant factors 
in explaining observed reductions in toxic discharges. The parish level 
estimates indicated that the higher the income levels, the more 
educated, and the more politically active the community, the greater 
the reductions in all three types of discharges over time. Furthermore, 
the results indicated that the greater the percentage of blacks in a 
parish, the greater the reductions in total and air discharges. This 
relationship may provide support to the observation that blacks are 
becoming more active in environmental issues (Bullard and Wright, 
1987). However, in terms of relative importance, income was a more 
important factor than race in explaining aggregated reductions in 
discharges.
The results revealed that the more TRI firms there are in a 
parish, the smaller the reductions in discharges over time. This seems 
to be a reasonable relationship since the number of TRI facilities may 
be describing the intensity of industrial activity in the area. The 
greater the industrial activity, the greater the production of 
discharges, and the smaller the relative impact of one source’s 
reduction in discharges. It is a difficult task to the regulator to 
pinpoint particular firm discharges over time when many firms are 
concentrated in an area. Therefore, firms located in industrial 
complexes may have the ability to "hide" from regulators.
Compared to the parish results, and contrary to expectations, the 
zip code level estimates suggested a weaker degree of local community 
effects on firms’ pollution control behavior. Income was the only
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significant variable in the air discharge reduction model. The results 
indicated that the higher the income levels, the greater the reductions 
in air discharges. The estimates of other socioeconomic variables, such 
as education and median home values, retained their signs, but not 
their significance. These results seem to suggest that more aggregated 
community characteristics better explain the pollution control behavior 
of firms. The estimation for the land discharge reduction model 
revealed the only significantly different relationship between parish 
and zip code results. The zip code estimates indicated that the higher 
the percentage of blacks in a zip code area, the smaller the reductions 
in land discharges over time.
Chapter 5 also estimated discharge reduction functions by 
individual firms. The individual firm’s discharge reduction behavior 
was modeled as a function of the characteristics of communities in 
their immediate proximity. Circles of increasing radii, indicating 
increasing levels of community aggregation, were alternatively drawn 
around each facility and the characteristics of the people who live 
within the circle were used as explanatory variables. The estimation 
results were very sensitive to the level of community aggregation and 
discharge type. The estimates of the reduction in total discharges, 
using one mile population characteristics, revealed that the greater 
the percentage of blacks in the immediate vicinity of the firm, the 
smaller the reductions in the firm’s total discharges. This finding is 
consistent with the claim that blacks are disproportionately exposed to 
greater environmental hazards than whites and may be less able or 
willing to do anything about it. However, this very localized 
relationship was not observed with more aggregated population
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characteristics, in this case for circles of larger radii. The 
percentage of older people (ages 62 and above) in the immediate 
community was a significant determinant of the observed reduction in 
total toxic discharges: the greater the percentage of older people in
the community, the greater the reductions in total discharges. 
Furthermore, the results consistently confirmed the "hiding" 
hypothesis: individual firm’s discharges are reduced by a smaller
amount when the number of other polluting firms in their proximity 
increases.
The estimates of a land discharge reduction function, using one 
mile community characteristics, showed a significantly different set of 
relationships. The results indicated that the greater the percentages 
of blacks, females, and elderly in the community, the greater the 
observed reductions in land discharges. Furthermore, the results 
revealed that the greater the number of other polluting firms in the 
immediate proximity of a firm, the greater the reductions in land 
discharges. Obviously, "hiding" is not a feasible strategy with a 
spatially concentrated externality. Firms’ behaviors may also reflect a 
major focus of federal and state policies, under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), on reducing land discharges.
The air discharge reduction function estimates, on the other hand, 
did not reveal any interesting relationships. There was some evidence 
that the more densely populated the community, the greater the efforts 
of the firm to reduce air discharges, although the relationship was not 
highly significant. There were no significant relationships between 
racial composition and the firm’s air discharge reduction behavior. The 
percentage of females in the immediate vicinity of the firm was the
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single socioeconomic variable with a highly significant cefficient 
estimate, indicating that the higher the percentage of females the 
greater the reductions in air discharges.
This dissertation presented ample evidence suggesting that 
potential exposure to toxics are systematically related to the 
socioeconomic and racial characteristics of the population. This study 
focused only on the distribution of toxic sources in Louisiana. The 
results are very specific to this type of hazard. A comprehensive study 
of the social distribution of cumulative environmental hazards, 
including commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities, landfills, 
and Superfund sites, across the population will prove invaluable to 
policymakers.
The distance-exposure relationships may have not been exact, since 
we did not employ dispersion models. Furthermore, the exposure measures 
were based on the assumption that people stayed at their places of 
residence. A logical extension of this study would require the use of 
human exposure modelling (such as the REHEX model employed by Brajer 
and Hall, 1992) that would account for the location and mobility of 
residents.
The findings of this dissertation revealed that the results are 
very sensitive to the level of community aggregation. Future research 
should emloy, if possible, localized and distance specific information 
about the population when studying the distribution of environmental 
risks.
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Appendix A
Criteria for Reporting Toxic Releases
Section 313 of Title III of Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act, requires certain manufacturing firms to submit to U.S. EPA data on 
their emissions of some 300 toxic chemicals. EPA lists a chemical as 
toxic if it meets the following criteria:
1 . it is expected to cause a significant adverse acute effects 
(short term) on human health;
2 . it is expected to cause chronic (long term) health effects; or,
3. it is expected to cause significant adverse effects on the 
environment.
A manufacturing firm is required to submit a TRI report form if it 
meets the following criteria:
1 . it has ten or more full-time employees;
2. it is included in Standard Industrial Classification codes 20 
through 39; and
3. a) it manufactured or processed a reportable toxic chemical in
quantities exceeding the reportable limits established by 
EPA for that calander year, or 
b) it used 10,000 pounds of reportable toxic chemicals that 
calander year.
Reporting requirements are subject to change over time. A TRI 
report form must be filed for each listed chemical that is manufactured
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or processed over the course of a year in amounts equal to or greater 
than:
75.000 pounds for calander year 1987
50.000 pounds for calander year 1988
25.000 pounds for calander year 1989 and subsequent years.
EPA publishes this data in the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and,
by law, makes the information accessible to the public. The information 
collected in TRI is "intended to inform the general public and the 
communities surrounding covered facilities about releases of toxic 
chemicals, to assist research, to aid in the development of regulation, 




Consider points A(x , y ) and B(x ,y ) where x and y represent thea a b b
latitudes and longitudes of points A and B, respectively. T j calculate 
the distance between A and B, we need to measure the length of a degree 
of latitude and the length of a degree of longitude.
Because the earth approximates an oblate spheroid, a north-south 
line has more curvature near the equator and less near the poles. 
Consequently, degrees of north-south arc on the earth are not quite the 
same lengths in units of uniform surface distance but vary from about 
69.4 miles near the poles to about 68.7 miles near the equator. For the 
United States, these numbers vary from 68.833 miles in Washington State 
to 69.121 miles near Florida State. For the purpose of this study, the 
length of a degree of latitude is approximated by the average for the
United States which is 68.9713. The latitude of the distance between A
and B is calculated as follows:
(B.l) LAT = (x - x )(68.9713)a b
The length of the equator is nearly the same as the length of a 
meridian circle but, as we go toward the poles, all other parallels 
become smaller and smaller circles; yet each is divided into 360 
degrees. The length of a degree of longitude is equal to the cosine of 
the latitude times length of a degree of latitude. Formally, the 
longitude of the distance between A and B is calculated as:
(B. 2) LONG = (y - y )(cos((x + x )/2)) (6 8 . 9713)a b a b
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Finally, the distance between points A and B is calculated as: 
(B. 3) DISTANCE = Sqrt(LAT2 + LONG2)
Appendix C 
Comparative Statics
I. Product Price Changes
To study the effect of changes in the price of product x on 
optimal input demands, substitute z and a in the first-order 
conditions (4.17), totally differentiate the system of equations with 
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The effect of changes in the price of marketable produce x on the 
demand for production input z and the demand for abatement input a are 
clearly indeterminate. The behavior of product x with respect to its 
own-price is obtained by totally differentiating (4.20) with respect to 
P which yields
(C. 3)
* * *dx 9a 9z
~dP~ - X a~9P_ + X Z~ 9 P ~
Substituting (C.l) and (C.2) into (C.3)
dx 1
lC'4) dP | H
to sign (C.4), complete the square and rewrite
r 2X 71L a 2 2x x n + x a z za z* 1: aaj
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The sign of (C.5) is determined from the second order conditions for 
profit maximization (4.18). Output x is positively related to its own 
price (upward sloping supply function for x).
Totally differentiating (4.21) with respect to P yields the effect 
of a change in price of x on the optimal amount of hazard produced:
It is apparent that (C.7) can not be signed directly; nevertheless, it
is possible to infer the sign by some mathematical manipulations. Note
that x and h are joint products. Increased production of x, holding
abatement effort constant, is expected to increase the level of hazard
$production which means that dh /dP is expected to be positive. From the 
first order conditions in (4.17) obtain P = Px - C h and P = Pxz z h z a a
C h , square both sides of these two equations, solve for h x andh a  z z
h x , respectively. Multiply the first equation (P ) by the seconda fi z
(P_^and solve for (h^x + h^x ). Performing these operations yield the 
following sets of equations:
(C. 6 )
Substituting (C.l) and (C.2) into (C.6 ) yields
(C.7) dh 1 it h x  -  naa z z h x + h x + rt h xdP za z a a z zz a a
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(C. 8 ) h x = - [p2 ~ p2><2 " c2h2l
z z h *- Z Z h ZJ
(C. 9) h x = - ~  Ip2 - P2x2 - C2h2la a Z r L  a a h aj
(C.10) h x + h x = |P2X x + c 2h h - P Pa z z a r L z a h z a z ah L
Substitution for these terms in (C.7) yields
*
(C.11) dhdP IHFTf [2PCJ  1 {[". P2 + n P2 - Zn P Paa z zz a za z a
P2 nr x2 + 7i x2 - 2n x x II aa z zz a za z a |
C2[tt h2 + 7i h2 - 2tt h h 11 = hI aa z zz a za z al <
By the second order conditions the first set of terms in brackets is
2 *negative, the second set of terms which is equivalent to P (dx /dP) 
from (C.4) is positive, and the third set is positive. Consequently, a 
sufficient condition for dh /dP > 0 is that the absolute value of the 
first term must be less than the absolute value of the sum of the 
second and third set of terms.
II. Input Prices Change
The effects of changes in price of production inputs z and a, P
Z
and P , on the demand for z and a are given by:a










71  ̂za - n [h T  < 0 as it = 0za >
Own price effects (C.12) and (C.14) are negative from the second order 
conditions for profit maximization. When price of production input z 
increases, utilization of z will decrease, ceteris paribus; and when 
price of abatement inpr a, P , increases, abatement effort willa
decrease, ceteris paribus. Cross price effects (C.13) and (C.15), on 
the other hand, are indeterminate. By Young’s Theorem, the cross price 
effects are equivalant (n = n ). If the two inputs, z and a, areza az
substitutes, then n < 0 ; if they are independent then n = 0 , and ifza za
they are complements n > 0 .za
The impact of a change in price of production input z on the 
production of x is obtained by totally differentiating (4.20) with 
respect to P which yields:
(C.16)
* # *dx 3z da
"dF " Xz~3 F  + XalP“
Substituting for 3z /3P and
Z




(C.17) dxdP (TTT [v. - x naa a za
Note that using (C.l), dx /dP = - Sz /SP; if z is a normal input then
Z
★
Sz /SP > 0 and hence, the sign of (C.17) is expected to be negative.
The impact of a change in price of z on the production of h is 
obtained by totally differentiating (4.21) with respect to P whichz
yields:
tr io> dh* u 3z* , u Sa*(c'18) T F  = hz^r + h,^iF
Substituting for Sz /SP and Sa /SP from (C.12) and (C.15)z z
respectively, rewrite (C.18) as
* r i
(C. 19) = |„ | h 7T - h 71 = 0dP j H j [_ z aa a zaj <
When price of the production input z increases, less z will be used 
*since Sz /SP < 0 from (C.12). If (C.17) is negative, an increase in the
Z
price of z results in a decrease in production of x. Given that h is a 
by-product of x, it is expected that the production of h will decrease 
as a result of higher production input prices. A sufficient condition 
for (C.19) to be negative is that z and a be independent or substitute 
inputs (n ^ 0 ).za
The impact of a change in price of abatement input a on the 
production of x is obtained by totally differentiating (4.2.0) with 
respect to P which yields:a
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Substituting for dz*/dP and da*/dP from (C.13) and (C.15)a a
respectively, rewrite (C.20) as
¥
(C. 21) = — 1 * 1 [x 7t - x ?t 1 = 0d P  j H | [_ a zz z zaj <
Using (C.2) note that dx /dP = - Sa /SP; if a is an inferior input ind
the production of x, then Sa /SP < 0, and (C.21) is expected to be 
positive.
The impact of a change in price of a on the production of h is 
obtained by totally differentiating (4.21) with respect to P which 
yields:
* * #
f n  OOI , Sz , , Sa
(c'22) I F  ” V s T  * h. l F
Substituting for Sz /SP and Sa /SP from (C.13) and (C.15)a a
respectively, rewrite (C.22) as
* r t
(C. 23) = ip. h n - h n =dP^ j H  | |_ a zz z zaj <
When P increases, the firm will employ less a given (C.14). A3.
sufficient condition for (C.23) to be positive would be if the absolute
value of h n is less than the absolute value of h n or if n i 0 , z za a zz za
that is z and a are substitutes or independent inputs.
III. Changes in Households’ Remediation Efforts
A question of particular interest in this study is the impact of 
changes in households’ remediation efforts on the firm’s output and
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hazard production or hazard control behavior. The impact of changes in 
r on demand for z is given by
(C.24) SzSr i-fn—  C I h tt — h 7i| n  J hr z aa a a = C
dh >
hr dP <
(C.25) Sa~dF = i*. -C [h 7i -h Ti 1 = Cn hr I a zz z azl dh ^ 0hr dP < a
where C > 0 by assumption; although (C.24) and (C.25) can not behr
signed as expressed, (C.25) is expected to be positive, if tt ^ 0.za
Differentiating (4.20) with respect to r yields
(C.26)
* * #dx Sz Sa—  = x — 5—  + x — 5—  dr z Sr a Sr
Substituting for Sz /Sr and Sa /Sr from (C.24) and (C.25), rearranging 
the terms, and further substituting from (C.17) and (C.20) yields the 
following expression
(C.27) dx = COr  hr
* * dx , dx
z dP a dP < 0
given the assumptions about input normality and inferiority.
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